Ein el Tal (Handarat) Refugee Camp

Ein el Tal, which sits on a hill next to a quarry, is an “unofficial” camp situated about 13 kilometers northeast of Aleppo, in an area that feels more rural than urban. It is locally known as mukhayyam Handarat (Handarat Camp) because of its proximity to the Syrian village of Handarat. The camp has been severely affected by the war in Syria that followed the 2011 uprisings against the regime. In 2013, the camp’s population was entirely displaced and its infrastructure was heavily damaged because of the war. In 2017, some families began to return to the camp despite the extensive infrastructural damage.

Establishment of the Camp

Ein el Tal camp was established in 1962 on 0.16 square kilometers of land that the Syrian state owned and which it made available to Palestinian refugees, who had been renting homes in various parts of Aleppo, to build their own houses. It is an “unofficial camp,” meaning that the area it occupies was not designated as a camp at the onset of Palestinian displacement to Syria during the 1948 war but emerged several years (in this case, fourteen years) following this displacement. Because it is an unofficial camp, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is not responsible for solid waste collection; the government is. At its establishment, the camp was administered by UNRWA, in collaboration with and under the supervision of the Palestine Arab Refugee Institution (PARI), the main Syrian government organ overseeing Palestinian refugee camps after the Nakba.

Ein el Tal’s original inhabitants were Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war and their descendants who traced their origins to northern Palestine. A significant number of them traced their specific origins to the villages of Ayn Ghazal, Tarshiha, and al-Zib.

In 2005, Ein el Tal’s population was 4,521 inhabitants. By the eve of the 2011 Syrian uprisings, Ein el Tal’s population had reached 7,000 inhabitants, most of whom lived in stone houses with small yards and enjoyed cordial relations with their Syrian neighbors from the adjacent tribal settlements of al-Shaher and Haret al-Baggara and the surrounding villages of Handarat and Hilan.

Infrastructure

When Ein el Tal was established, residents began building their own homes, which were generally made of stone. Ein el Tal’s older refugees remember the establishment of the camp in the early 1960s, when the area was simply a big barren and rocky hill with roaming foxes and wild dogs. One older resident recalled that people carried soil from neighboring areas for planting trees and gardens and used stones from the rocky terrain to build their houses. The layout of the camp loosely followed a grid format, with different neighborhoods of the camp separated by mostly unpaved roads. Some of these neighborhoods, such as Tarshiha and Ayn Ghazal, were labeled according to the residents’ place of origin in Palestine. Initially, residents built their houses on as much land as they could afford. During subsequent expansions of the camp in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Syrian authorities allowed them to build only on a specific area.

UNRWA documents reveal that, by 2005, only 20 percent of Ein el Tal’s inhabitants had access to adequate sewage disposal facilities and only 60 percent of them had access to safe drinking water. At that time most of the camp’s internal roads were unpaved, and public transportation only reached the camp’s outer limits. A key development contributed to addressing these infrastructural shortcomings. In 2000, UNRWA and the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR) that replaced PARI decided to incorporate Ein el Tal into the Neirab Rehabilitation Project, which emerged in 1998 and sought to improve the Neirab camp’s infrastructure and economic life. As a result of this decision, the geographic limits of Ein el Tal were expanded to accommodate three hundred families from the neighboring and overcrowded Palestinian refugee camp of Neirab, twenty kilometers away from Ein el Tal. This expansion of Ein el Tal’s limits resulted in the emergence in 2003 of a new neighborhood in the camp: mashru‘ (“the project,” a reference to the new UNRWA houses being built to accommodate refugees who were moving from neighboring Neirab camp). The same year UNRWA introduced the Housing Improvement Loans program, which aimed to provide the original inhabitants of the camp who were living below the poverty line with funds to upgrade their housing. It was considered an expansion of UNRWA’s shelter rehabilitation program.

Many other infrastructural changes followed: by 2007, several of the camp’s roads were paved; the bus system servicing Aleppo and its surroundings was extended into Ein el Tal; a sewage system was established in the camp; and a water tower was built inside the camp and new water pipe were installed, resolving the issue of safe and equitable access to water. A soccer field was also constructed in the center of the camp, providing the camp’s male youth with an additional recreational area.

Prior to the war in Syria, the camp was divided into five neighborhoods: Ayn Ghazal, Tarshiha, Wasat (situated at the center of the camp), al-Jabal (situated at the top of the hill on which the camp lies and the result of an earlier expansion of the camp in the 1990s), and Mashru‘.

The war that engulfed Syria in the aftermath of the Syrian uprisings has had a devastating impact on the camp. According to UNRWA, in 2018 as much as 70 percent of the camp was completely destroyed by the war, with remaining areas partially destroyed. In November 2019, volunteers from the Palestinian Red Crescent worked to reestablish power in Ein el Tal’s UNRWA-run school and to rehabilitate public space. As of 2020/2021, considerable progress was made by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Syrian authorities in restoring the camp’s water and electricity services. As of January 2024, UNRWA has identified rubble removal, the restoration of services, and the rehabilitation of UNRWA installations where possible as its top priorities for Ein el Tal.

Socioeconomic Conditions

In the early days of the Syrian uprisings and war, Ein el Tal became a refuge for Syrian civilians from neighboring areas seeking protection from aerial bombings by the Syrian army and clashes between the Syrian army and non-state armed groups. These newcomers were mostly housed in the camp’s schools and nursery. However, it was only a matter of time before Ein el Tal was drawn into the Syrian conflict. The camp was seen by both the Syrian government and Syrian rebels as a strategic area, given its location on a hill and its proximity to major official government infrastructure such as al-Kindi hospital (also located on a hill) and Aleppo’s Central Prison. On 27 April 2013, Syrian rebels invaded the camp and ordered the entire population to leave. Ein el Tal’s residents experienced repeated displacement after their initial expulsion from the camp. Many of the displaced sought refuge in various parts of Aleppo (including vacant student housing in the University of Aleppo) and in neighboring Neirab Camp. Later on, a few Palestinian families were able to return to the camp but, by March 2014, many of them were forced out again by the heavy shelling; some sought refuge outside Syria, with the Turkish border city of Kilis being a major destination. In summer 2017, families started to return to Ein el Tal camp. As of 2018, the humanitarian situation was still dire: several families were forced to rent units in the camp (due to the destruction) at steep prices and were dealing with a combined water and (electrical) power crisis. UNRWA estimates that, as of the end of 2020, around 120 Palestine refugee families live in the camp, in addition to a few Syrian families.

Employment

Prior to the Syrian uprisings, Ein el Tal’s inhabitants were in a somewhat economically vulnerable situation. Drawing on 2005 research, UNRWA paints the following portrait of prewar Ein el Tal: the camp had a 36 percent unemployment rate among men and a 74 percent unemployment rate among women. The jobs most commonly held by men were construction work, blacksmithing, factory/skilled labor, and driving. The jobs most commonly held by women were teaching, office work, tailoring, and nurse/medical assistant. Close to half of both male and female Palestinian refugees from Ein el Tal were working for the Syrian government, and only 1 percent were working for UNRWA.

Education

UNRWA has provided education in Ein el Tal since the camp’s inception. Prior to the 2011 uprisings, two UNRWA schools provided elementary and preparatory education (following the Syrian government’s curriculum): Nasr el-Din school provided elementary education and al-Zib school (named after the depopulated Palestinian village of al-Zib) provided both elementary and preparatory education and operated on a double shift: one set of students came in the morning and the other set came in the afternoon. A Syrian government school, Zuheir Mohsen school, provided secondary education. (Zuheir Mohsen was a Palestinian nationalist, a leader of the pro-Syrian militant organization, al-Saiqa, and head of the military department of the Palestine Liberation Organization.) UNRWA data from 2005 shows that attendance rate decreased between school years with significant decreases between elementary, preparatory (Grades 7-9), and secondary schools (Grades 10-12). A major reason for this decrease was the pressure that (mostly) young boys felt to contribute economically to their households. (Data also showed that this pressure did not come directly from their parents, many of whom would have preferred that their sons stay in school.) The Women’s Programme Centre, a community-based organization overseen by UNRWA’s department of relief and social services, ran a part time nursery as well as classes for students who were struggling with school or had dropped out altogether. The center also offered computer and hairdressing courses.

After the 2011 uprisings, UNRWA-run schools were closed because of staff safety concerns; the schools were subsequently used to house displaced families from places beyond the camp. During the violent fighting, UNRWA schools were severely affected: one building has been completely destroyed, and the other one is severely damaged and in 2023 was being assessed for possible rehabilitation. Due to the destruction of the Zuheir Mohsen school, in 2023 Ein el Tal students at the secondary education level were bused to the Mikhael Kashour secondary school in Aleppo.

Health

Until 2005, health services inside Ein el Tal were provided through a part-time UNRWA-run health clinic, which received an average of 2,000 visits per month. Services included maternal and child health, prenatal and antenatal care, and management of communicable diseases. In July 2005, as part of Ein el Tal’s incorporation into the Neirab Rehabilitation Project, the camp’s clinic transitioned to a full-time schedule. UNRWA ceased its services in Ein el Tal in 2013 after the camp was infiltrated by Syrian rebels. Since the agency resumed its services in the camp in 2023, its health services have taken the form of a weekly mobile health clinic.

Before the war, UNRWA was able to facilitate healthcare for more serious health issue through contracts that it had with hospitals across Syria and that provided gynecological and general surgery services. UNRWA mentions in a 2005 report that, at the time, it paid 88 percent of the costs of operations for Palestinian refugees and 95 percent of the costs for those deemed Special Hardship Cases. The report also mentions that the agency assisted with critical surgery and cardiology services across the country by paying a set rate of 25,000 Syrian pounds, which was given directly to refugees to assist with the costs.

Camp Management

At its inception, Ein Tal camp was under the supervision of the Palestine Arab Refugee Institution, which was established by the Syrian government in 1949 within the Ministry of Interior. In 1974, this refugee institution was replaced by the General Administration for Palestinian Arab Refugees (GAPAR), whose staff are mainly Palestinian refugees and which operates under the umbrella of the Syrian Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs. UNRWA has always coordinated its work with Syrian authorities. GAPAR never had an office in the camp even though it played a major role in the supervision and surveillance of the camp. Its staff regularly visit the camp and rely on a network of informants within it.

In 2011, most of Ein el Tal’s residents did not participate in the uprisings against the Syrian government. However, some of the Palestinian refugees from Ein el Tal reported participating in relief efforts toward neighboring areas affected by the unfolding instability and violence. In April 2013 Syrian rebels, consisting of factions, fighting under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army, and the Islamist group jabhat tahrir al-sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front), invaded Ein el Tal, which subsequently became the center of heavy fighting between these rebels and troops loyal to the Syrian government. While the camp’s population as a whole did not participate in the fighting, refugees from Ein el Tal noted that individual Palestinians joined pro-regime militias or rebel groups. As for Palestinian political factions, two of them, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command and Fatah al-Intifada, openly sided with the Syrian government, but none of these developments resulted in any infighting between the camp’s Palestinian political factions. In 2018, the Syrian government regained control of Ein el Tal, and UNRWA resumed services in the camp, once again, in collaboration with GAPAR.

Civil and Political Organizations in the Camp

Prior to the 2011 uprisings, there was some level of civil society activism on the part of Ein el Tal’s refugee population, especially in terms of support to financially insecure families in the camp. This support typically consisted of food, money, and school supply donations. However, this support was not provided on a continuous basis and mostly occurred during Ramadan, weddings, and funerals. It was typically tied to the social branches of Palestinian political factions or to religious institutions. Ein el Tal’s Mosque Committee was involved in charitable activities. However, the main, institutionalized, charitable organization operating in Ein el Tal, was the Palestinian Charitable Association (Jam‘iyya al-khayriyya al-filastiniyya), which also had branches in neighboring Neirab camp and in the city of Aleppo.

Jamaiyat, which are neighborhood-based savings organizations, also played a role as a safety net for residents in Ein el Tal through the provision of interest-free loans. These Jamaiyat assist newly married couples through the provision of loans and gifts.

Aside from Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, the inhabitants of Ein el Tal had affiliations with the political factions Fatah, Fatah al-Intifada, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. However, these factions have no role in the day-to-day management or security of the camp, given the tight grip that the Syrian government maintained in Ein el Tal through GAPAR.

Conclusion

Despite the end of fighting in the area since 2018, the residents of Ein el Tal camp continue to face lack of security, in the form of unexploded devices such as cluster grenades and property theft including furniture, and dangling electrical wires. As of 2023, the majority of Ein el Tal’s displaced inhabitants have not returned to the camp and it is not clear that they ever will; some have been displaced outside of Syria, becoming refugees once again but now in Europe or Turkey. Those who left Syria are hesitant to return because they fear being targeted by the Syrian government, they are reluctant to deal with the destruction and devastation caused by the war inside Syria, or they realize that some of the socioeconomic and political opportunities they have encountered in Europe are not guaranteed to them in Syria.