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Israeli Intelligence Report on the Depopulation of Palestine, 30 June 1948
Intelligence Service (Arab Section)
Migration of Eretz Yisrael [Palestine] Arabs
Between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948
30 June 1948
Introduction to the Document by Akevot (Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research), 4 July 2019
[An IDF intelligence report from 1948 (...), having been concealed ever since it was uncovered in the 1980s, contradicts the Israeli narrative about the major factor in the displacement of Israel’s Arab residents during the 1948 war. According to this document, during the early months of the war, operations by Jewish combatants were the major cause of Arab displacement, and the role played by the Arab leadership in encouraging “flight” was negligible. Akevot Institute publishes the full document upon publication of its report SILENCING: DSDE’s Concealment of Documents in Archives.
During the first break in the fighting in the war of 1948, the IDF Intelligence Department compiled a report about the scale of Arab displacement since the beginning of the war. The 25-page document entitled “Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947, and June 1, 1948”, concludes that the displacement of some 70% of the Arabs during this time should be attributed to military operations carried out by Jewish forces, while orders given by Arab leaders impacted the displacement of only 5%. The report itself, spanning ten pages, reviews the scale of the migration and its causes and presents the areas where the displaced arrived. The annex contains a detailed list of the communities from which Palestinians were displaced and the degree of and reasons why each and every one of these communities was emptied of residents.
The document was first uncovered in the Hashomer Hatzair Archive (Yad Ya’ari) in the mid-1980s, by historian Benny Morris, who used it as the basis for his published article entitled “The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: The Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948”. Morris flagged several factual errors, but found the report to be reliable overall.
After Morris’ article was published in 1986, the document was removed from public access, initially on the orders of the Chief State Archivist, and later on the orders of the DSDE as part of wide-ranging and unlawful work carried out by the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment to deny public access to documents in various archives. (…) Akevot Institute researchers found another copy of the document at the Yad Ya’ari Archive and it is published here, in full, for the first time.]
Contents
1. General introduction.
2. Basic figures on Arab migration
3. National phases of evacuation and migration
4. Causes of Arab migration
5. Arab migration trajectories and absorption issues
Annexes
1. Regional reviews analyzing migration issues in each area [Missing from document]
2. Charts of villages evacuated by area, noting the causes for migration and migration trajectories for every village
1. General introduction
The purpose of this overview is to attempt to evaluate the intensity of the migration and its various development phases, elucidate the different factors that impacted population movement directly and assess the main migration trajectories. Of course, given the nature of statistical figures in Eretz Yisrael in general, which are, in themselves, deficient, it would be difficult to determine with certainty absolute numbers regarding the migration movement, but it appears that the figures provided herein, even if not certain, are close to the truth. Hence, a margin of error of ten to fifteen percent needs to be taken into account. The figures on the population in the area that lies outside the State of Israel are less accurate, and the margin of error is greater. This review summarizes the situation up until June 1st, 1948 (only in one case - the evacuation of Jenin, does it include a later occurrence).
2. Basic figures on Arab population movement in Eretz Yisrael
a. At the time of the UN declaration [resolution] regarding the division of Eretz Yisrael, the following figures applied within the borders of the Hebrew state:
|
1. |
219 Arab villages. |
|
|
2. |
4 Cities with Arab populations as well (Haifa, Tiberias, Safed, Beit Shean) |
|
|
3. |
The Arab rural population in the State of Israel was |
190,000 |
|
4. |
The Arab urban population in the State of Israel was |
92,000 |
|
5. |
The Bedouin population in the State of Israel, in the Negev was |
60,000 (estimate) |
|
|
|
342,000 |
b. The rate of migration from the State of Israel until June 1, 1948 (including Jenin and the south, until June 14, 1948):
|
1. |
Approximately 180 Arab villages empty. |
|
|
2. |
3 cities entirely empty, and in Haifa, only 5,000 residents. |
|
|
3. |
Of the total rural Arab population in the country, the number of people who migrated: |
152,000
|
|
4. |
Of the total urban Arab population in the country, the number of people who migrated |
87,000
|
|
5. |
Negev Bedouin did not migrate at all from the country |
|
|
6. |
Total who left the State of Israel |
239,000
|
In percentages:
|
1. |
82% of the total number of Arab rural locales in the country were abandoned. |
|
2. |
80% of the total rural Arab population in the country left. |
|
3. |
94% of the total urban Arab population in the country left. |
|
4. |
0% of the total Negev Bedouin migrated. |
c. The rate of migration in the territory of the Arab state + Jerusalem:
|
1. |
At least 70 Arab villages were evacuated in the Arab state. |
|
2. |
3 Arab cities were evacuated - one completely (Jenin), and 2 of the majority of residents. (4,000 persons were left in Acre, and 4,600 in Jaffa). |
|
3. |
Two other Arab cities were partly evacuated (Lod, Ramla). |
|
4. |
50,000 villagers from the Arab state left and migrated. |
|
5. |
72,000 urban dwellers from the Arab state left and migrated. |
|
6. |
The total number of Arabs who migrated from the Arab state: 122,000. |
|
7. |
30,000 Arabs migrated from Jerusalem. |
|
8. |
In total, 152,000 Eretz Yisarel Arabs migrated from their places of residence outside the State of Israel. |
d. The number of Arabs who remained in the State of Israel:
|
1. |
No. of urban dwellers who remained in the State of Israel |
5,000 |
|
2. |
No. of villagers who remained in the State of Israel |
38,000 |
|
3. |
No. of Bedouins (in the Negev) who remained in the State of Israel |
60,000 |
|
|
[Total] |
103,000 |
|
4. |
39 inhabited Arab villages remained in the country (With respect to some, there is no information that they left). |
|
|
5. |
Only one of the cities of the State of Israel has an Arab population (Haifa: 5,000 persons). |
|
e. The rate of migratory movement in Eretz Yisrael as a whole:
The number of displaced Arabs is 391,000.
(As stated in the introduction, the margin of error is 10%-15%).
Comments:
1.For more details regarding these figures and a breakdown by area - see the table below.
2. For a list of villages, towns, reasons for evacuation, trajectories, etc., see enclosed annexes.
3. Phases in the Arab migration
The six-month Arab migration (December 1947 to May and beyond) has four distinct phases:
First phase: Begins in early December and lasts until late February.
Second phase: The month of March.
Third phase: The month of April.
Fourth phase: The month of May.
The phases in detail:
First phase: The main feature of this stage is that, at this time, the migration movement is only beginning. It occurs in few places. In all fronts throughout the country, movement is extremely small. Only in the Central Region, movement takes place at the end of this phase, that is, mostly in February, when movement there begins and its intensity, per se, is medium.
Second phase: At this stage, a small amount of movement is felt in most fronts, and in fact, there is a slight reduction compared to the first phase. In some fronts, it seems that migration is waning. This is particularly true with respect to the Central Region, where activity was felt during the first phase. However, where the national trend is a decline, the Jaffa front, as well as the Sea of Galilee area, exhibit an increase with a stronger intensity than the intensity of evacuation in the first phase.
Third phase: This phase is marked by a moderate increase in almost most fronts, moderate increase in the Sea of Galilee area with the evacuation of Tiberias. Moderate increase in the Haifa area with the evacuation of Haifa. Moderate increase in the Tel-Hai district with increased activities on our part. No change in the state of migration in the Negev, which had yet to begin evacuation. Balanced situation in terms of the evacuation of Jaffa - i.e. slight increase from the previous phase and as a continuation thereof. Decrease in migration movement in the Gilboa area. However, a major increase in the Central Region, which peaks in this month, both on the national level and in terms of movement in the region itself. In conclusion: the third phase shows a moderate general increase with one peak point and one downward trend.
The fourth phase: This stage spans the month of May. It is the principal and decisive phase of the Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael. A migration psychosis begins to emerge, a crisis of confidence with respect to Arab strength. As a result, migration in this sage is characterized by:
Major increase in migration trajectory in Tel-Hai district.
Gilboa “
Jaffa “
Western Galilee “
Evacuation in Negev villages takes place in this month. On the other hand, the Central Region enters this phase having peaked already, with most villages having been evacuated. Therefore, for the Central Region, this phase is the "final stretch". Because the number of remaining villages in the Central Region was small, the seemingly significant decrease felt here is no more than the final touch. The only place where a true decrease is felt in this month is the Sea of Galilee area.
Conclusion: The mass migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs took place in April-May. May was a climax and recorded as the month during which most of the Arab migration took place, or, more precisely, the Arab flight.
4. Causes of Arab migration
a. General
It is reasonable to assume that this migration was not financially motivated - be it a shortage of employment, food or any other financial distress. So long as residents remained where they were, the Arab economy was not harmed in such a way that broke the population's ability to support itself. The financial factor was a motivator in migration only during the very initial phases of the migration movement, when the wealthy among the Arabs, wishing to secure their property and factories, were quick to emigrate. A fluctuation in Arab economic stability was felt in the cities, a fluctuation that was a migration catalyst for some social strata, but this fluctuation - such as the migration of the wealthy, is not a major factor when discussing the mass migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs.
It is also reasonable to assume that the population movement was not the result of "purely" political factors, meaning: political decisions, in the narrow sense of the word, had no effect whatsoever on the migration movement. Although the massive Arab migration proliferated particularly in the month of May, this should not be taken to be the result of the political significance of that month. Here, it should be noted, that inasmuch as there were locales where the political factor was a motivator for migration movement, this was confined to the cities, and there too, in very limited strata and on a minute scale. These numbers are so small, compared to the general wave of migration and its intensity, that it can be assumed, with certainty, that political factors had no effect whatsoever on the movement of the Arab population.
In reviewing the factors that affected migration, we list the factors that had a definitive effect on population migration. Other factors, localized and smaller scale, are listed in the special reviews of migration movement in each district. The factors, in order of importance, are:
1. Direct Jewish hostile actions against Arab communities.
2. Impact of our hostile actions against communities neighboring where migrants lived (here -particularly - the fall of large neighboring communities).
3. Actions taken by the Dissidents [Irgun, Lehi].
4. Orders and directives issued by Arab institutions and gangs.
5. Jewish Whispering operations [psychological warfare] intended to drive Arabs to flee.
6. Evacuation ultimatums.
7. Fear of Jewish retaliation upon a major Arab attack on Jews.
8. The appearance of gangs and foreign fighters near the village.
9. Fear of an Arab invasion and its consequences (mostly near the borders).
10. Arab villages isolated within purely Jewish areas.
11. Various local factors and general fear of what was to come.
b. The factors in detail.
Without a doubt, hostilities were the main factor in the population movement. Each and every district underwent a wave of migration as our actions in that area intensified and expanded. In general, for us, the month of May signified a transition into wide-scale operations, which is why the month of May involved the evacuation of the maximum number of locales. The departure of the English, which was merely the other side of the coin, did, of course, help evacuation, but it appears that more than affecting migration directly, the British evacuation freed our hands to take action.
Note that it was not always the intensity of the attack that was decisive, as other factors became particularly prominent - mostly psychological factors. The element of surprise, long stints of shelling with extremely loud blasts, and loudspeakers in Arabic proved very effective when properly used (mostly Haifa!);
It has, however, been proven, that actions had no lesser effect on neighboring communities as they did on the community that was the direct target of the action. The evacuation of a certain village as a result of us attacking it swept with it many neighboring villages.
The impact of the fall of large villages, centers, towns or forts with a large concentration of communities around them is particularly apparent. The fall of Tiberias, Safed, Samakh, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre produced many large migration waves. The psychological motivation at work here was "If the mighty have fallen....". In conclusion, it can be said that at least 55% of the overall migration movement was motivated by our actions and their impact.
The actions of the Dissidents and their impact as migration motivators: The actions of the Dissidents as migration motivators were particularly apparent in the Jaffa Tel-Aviv area; the Central Region, the south and the Jerusalem area. In other places, they did not have any direct impact on evacuation. Dissidents' actions with special impact: Deir Yassin, the kidnapping off five dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis, other actions in the south. The Deir Yassin action had a particular impact on the Arab psyche. Much of the immediate fleeing seen when we launched our attacks, especially in the center and south, was panic flight resulting from that factor, which can be defined as a decisive catalyst. There was also panic flight spurred by actions taken by the Irgun and Lehi themselves. Many Central Region villagers went into flight once the dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis were kidnapped. The Arab learned that it was not enough to make a deal with the Haganah, and there were "other Jews", of whom one must be wary, perhaps even more wary than of members of the Haganah, which had no control over them.
The Dissidents' effect on the evacuation of Jaffa city and the Jaffa rural area is clear and definitive -decisive and critical impact among migration factors here. If we were to assess the contribution made by the Dissidents as factors in the evacuation of Arabs in Eretz Yisrael we would find that they had about 15% direct impact on the total intensity of the migration.
To summarize the previous sections, one could, therefore, say that the impact of "Jewish military action" (Haganah and Dissidents) on the migration was decisive, as some 70% of the residents left their communities and migrated as a result of these actions.
Orders and directives issued by Arab institutions and gangs: This evacuation, which may be termed "orderly evacuation" was carried out for strategic reasons, at the demand of the gangs, the Arab Higher Committee or the Transjordan government - whether as a result of a plan to turn the village into a base from which to launch attacks on Jews, an understanding that the village could not be defended, or fear that it would become a fifth column, especially if it had made an agreement with the Jews. The impact of this factor was mainly felt in the Gilboa area (threats to the Zu'biya), the Sea of Galilee area (Circassian villages), the Tel-Hai area (border villages), the center (isolated cases) and the Jerusalem area (Legion orders to evacuate a string of villages to serve as bases in northern Jerusalem, and the order issued by the Arab Higher Committee to the village of Esawiyah). However, compared to other factors, this element did not have decisive weight, and its impact amounts to some 5% of all villages having been evacuated for this reason.
Jewish psychological warfare to make Arab residents flee. This type of action, when considered as part of the national phenomena, was not a factor with a broad impact. However, 18% of all the villages in the Tel-Hai area, 6% of the village in the central region, and 4% of the Gilboa region villages were evacuated for this reason.
Where in the center and the Gilboa regions such actions were not planned or carried out on a wide scale, and therefore had a smaller impact, in the Tel-Hai district, this type of action was planned and carried out on a rather wide scale and in an organized fashion, and therefore yielded greater results. The action itself took the form of "friendly advice" offered by Jews to their neighboring Arab friends. This type of action drove no more than 2% of the total national migration.
Our ultimatums to Arab villages: This factor was particularly felt in the center, less so in the Gilboa area and to some extent in the Negev. Of course, these ultimatums, like the friendly advice, came after the stage had been set to some extent by hostilities in the area. Therefore, these ultimatums were more of a final push than the decisive factor. Two percent of all evacuated village locales in the country were evacuated due to ultimatums.
Fear of reprisals. This evacuation, which can also be termed "organized evacuation" came mostly after actions against Jews had been launched from inside the village or its vicinity. An Arab attack on a Jewish convoy (the "Ehud" convoy on route to Ahiam, for instance), or a Jewish Arab battle (the Mishmar HaEmek front, the Gesher front, the attack on Lehavot, etc.), automatically impacted the evacuation of nearby villages. One percent of evacuated Arab locales left due to this factor.
All other factors listed as the appearance of gangs and foreign fighters in the vicinity of a village, fear of the consequences of an Arab invasion that could turn the village into a battlefield, especially on the borders of the country, and the fact that certain villages were isolated inside purely Jewish areas, were also motivators for evacuation, depending on the locale. In some areas they had a greater impact than in others, just as in other areas, they had almost no impact at all. All these factors together account for no more than 1%.
General fear. Although this factor is listed last, it did have a sizeable impact and played a significant part in the evacuation. Still, given its generality, we chose to conclude with it. When the war began, various reasons caused general fear within the strata of the Arab public, which chose to emigrate for no apparent, particular, reason. However, this general fear was the primary manifestation of the "crisis of confidence" in Arab strength.
It is reasonable to assume that 10% of all villages evacuated for this reason, such that, in effect, the impact of the "crisis of confidence" was the third most important factor following our actions and the actions of the Dissidents and their impact. Local factors also had a rather marked impact on migration movement: failed negotiations, plans to impose restricted settlement, inability to adjust to certain realities, failed negotiations for maintaining the status-quo or non-aggression agreements - all had an effect in certain areas (for instance, the south), but fail to have any presence in other areas. It can be said that 8%-9% of the evacuated villages in the country were evacuated because of various local factors. These factors are listed by locales in the regional reviews attached herein.
General comments:
1. Evacuation psychosis:
The pace of evacuation often increased as a result of the emergence of an evacuation psychosis that surfaced like an infectious disease. So, for instance, it is reasonable to assume that, in Acre, the mass arrival of Haifa refugees who instilled the evacuation psychosis in Acre residents had a decisive impact. Given minor attacks and a push by various catalysing factors, a mass immigration movement from Acre has also started, with this psychosis having its fair share in it. In considering the factors for evacuation, it appears that this "unseen" factor cannot be disregarded.
2. The Typhus plague, where it appeared, was a catalyst in the evacuation - more than the disease itself, the panic that erupted due to rumors about the spread of the disease in the area, was the evacuation motivator.
3. The impact of extremely loud explosives, loudspeakers, etc., as psychological intimidation actions had on the migration movement must be highlighted (incidentally, no attempt was made to attach loud sirens to the wings of aircrafts that were bombing enemy posts - so these might have a great impact).
4. In places where a serious Arab fighting force was present, the village did not evacuate easily, and only a direct, serious action, took down this force and led to an evacuation.
5. In the early stages of the evacuation, when the scope was still small, Arab institutions tried to counter flight the evacuation and restrain the migration waves. The Arab Higher Committee decided, at the time, to take measures to depress flight by imposing restrictions and penalties, using threats and propaganda in the press, on the radio, etc. On this issue the Arab Higher Committee tried to enlist the help of neighboring countries, which often shared the same interests on this point. They mostly tried to prevent the flight of young men of conscription age. However, none of these actions were at all successful as no positive action was taken that could have restrained the factors that motivated and pushed the migration. The actions taken by the preventative mechanism simply led to corruption, and permits were issued in return for bribes. When the mass flight took place, this mechanism also collapsed, leaving only sporadic propaganda which yielded no real results.
5. Arab migration trajectories
a. General
One of the central questions in the discussion of Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael is the new centers where they are concentrated. On this issue, villagers and urban migrants are two different discussions. As a rule, it can be said that the origin of a group largely determined the migration destination. Most residents of Haifa originate from Lebanon and Syria, and so, the migration trajectory of most Haifa residents was toward Lebanon and Syria. Similarly, the people of Faluja, in Jaffa, returned to their village. However, it should be noted that most of the wealthy urban dwellers and people of means in the cities emigrated abroad.
Urban Arab dwellers markedly showed a more decisive migration trend. The road to the urban dweller's "final destination" was much shorter than that of the villager. While the urban dweller did not move around between stops along the way, the villager often had to move from one place to another multiple times. This affair, of the villager's wanderings, stems from several reasons, but mostly, the family origin of villagers determined the migration routes taken by those fleeing. For instance, in the first phase of the evacuation and flight, migrants tended to move from the planes to the mountains, or from the south to the coastal region.
Another factor that impacted migration trajectories in rural areas in the early stages was villagers fleeing to the nearest, largest Arab urban center - even if they had no family connections, work connections or acquaintances there. Here, security was the decisive factor. This factor was largely integrated with previous factors, and in other cases, in the absence of other factors, it was the decisive one. For these reasons, a villager had to divide his migration trail, unbeknownst to him, to multiple phases, multiple stops - as indeed, these factors did not always take him to a safe area.
A review of the migration trajectories of villagers reveals multiple stops, a much less apparent trend in the migration of city dwellers. So, for instance, some residents of the village of Beit Susin in the south, migrated to al-Mughar and from there to Yavneh, from Yavneh to Ashdod and from Ashdod to Gaza. For this reason, villages that served as destination points in the first phase of the flight, turned into points of escape in the second phase, and so forth. Many migrated to Beit Shean from neighboring villages, and had to flee from there when residents of Beit Shean themselves fled.
It is also important to note that given that villagers' migration routes were initially rather short (in terms of how far they got from the village), and given that a village was evacuated without our stationing a unit there permanently, there was also a movement of return to villages that had been evacuated, which forced us to engage, on more than one occasion, in expelling residents of a certain village.
There are no "national centers" of migration absorption to speak of, not only because no one organized the migration movement and took care to direct it in certain trajectories, but also because of the trajectories the Arab migration movement took. True, we ultimately do find centers where many Arab migrants remain, many who came from different parts of the country. This is the outcome of a long trail with many stops along the way, which was random, created solely by the security criterion. In this respect, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Transjordan abroad, the Arab Triangle, the Ramallah and Birzeit area and the southern coastal plain of Eretz Yisrael do form the main centers that absorbed Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael. However, this should not be taken as an indication on the national level.
One of the main questions, which we cannot answer, is: How many migrated abroad and how many to centers inside Eretz Yisrael? On this issue, we can only make several assumptions:
1. The wealthy among city dwellers migrated primarily to Arab countries.
2. Many villagers, including those lacking means, who came mostly from border areas, migrated to Syria and Lebanon.
3. The main migration to Egypt came from Jaffa, the south, Haifa and Jerusalem.
4. The main migration to Transjordan came from the Sea of Galilee communities, the Yizrael district, the Gilboa district, Acre, Jaffa and Jerusalem.
5. It appears that Syria and Lebanon received most of those who migrated abroad, followed by Transjordan, and lastly, Egypt.
b. Population absorption centers
The following is a list of the centers where those fleeing migrated. The list is divided by the different parts of the country, and the centers for each district or area are listed in order of importance.
1. Tel-Hai district
|
Syria |
Lebanon |
Darabshiyah |
Hula marshes |
|
Golan |
Sa'sa' |
Qaddita |
|
2. Sea of Galilee
|
Transjordan |
Syria |
Lebanon |
Nazareth and its vicinity |
|
Lubya |
Mughar |
Boutaiha |
Haifa |
|
Samakh (until it fell) |
Safed (until it fell) |
|
|
3. Yizrael district
|
"Triangle" villages |
Karmel villages |
Safuriya |
Ilut |
|
Tur'an |
Abu Shush |
Nazareth |
Transjordan |
4. Gilboa
|
Transjordan |
Nazareth and vicinity |
Arab triangle |
Gilboa Mountain |
|
Beit Shean (until it fell) |
|
|
|
5. Haifa city limits
|
Syria |
Lebanon |
Lebanese border area |
Triangle (until it fell) |
|
Nazareth and Shfaram |
Few to Egypt |
Few to Cyprus |
|
6. Acre city limits
|
Lebanon |
Border villages |
Transjordan |
Few to Cyprus |
7. Haifa-Western Galilee District
|
Northern border villages (Yarka, Tarshiha) |
Lebanon |
Triangle |
Ghabisiyya |
|
Sa'sa' |
Ijzim |
Dalia |
Ein Hawd |
|
Umm a-Zinat |
|
|
|
8. Central Region
|
Nablus |
Tulkarem |
Rummanah |
Umm al-Fahm |
|
Barta'ah |
Baqah al-Gharbiyah |
Jat |
Kufrein |
|
Taybeh |
Qalansuwa |
Qalqiliyah |
Kafr Qasem |
|
Majdal |
Tantura |
Ijzim |
Beit Lid |
|
Ramla |
Lod |
a-Sindiyana |
Haifa (until it fell) |
9. Jaffa city limits
|
Ramla |
Lod |
Gaza |
Khan Yunis |
|
South - coastal plane |
Egypt |
Amman (a few) |
Syria, Lebanon (a few) |
10. Jaffa villages
|
South |
Triangle |
Ramla |
Lod |
11. South
|
Gaza and coastal plane area |
Ramla |
Lod |
Hamama (a few) |
|
Masmiyya (a few) |
Beersheva (a very small number) |
|
|
12. Negev
|
Gaza |
Coastal areas outside the country |
||
|
|
Khan Yunis |
Majdal |
Beit Lahyia |
|
Nazla |
Khreibeh |
Damra |
|
13. Jerusalem
|
Hebron |
Bethlehem |
Beit Jala |
Ramallah |
|
Birzeit |
Transjordan |
Gaza and Egypt |
Syria (the wealthy) |
|
Lebanon (the wealthy) |
Egypt (the wealthy) |
|
|
c. Issues with absorption
The absorption of Arabs of means was not a problem per se, since they provided for themselves and handled, some more, some less, the new cost of living. However, since most of the migrants were not of this social stratum, not to mention that many left without any possessions, once the waves of migration began to arrive, serious issues with absorption emerged. The problems grew worse as time went by. This was expressed in the persistence of calls from Arab countries for refugees to return to their homes, and artificial pressure on young men of conscription age to return to the front. The sheer number of announcements issued by Syria and Lebanon indicate that the refugees were beginning to become a serious burden, and that they were clearly making their mark on the economy of neighboring countries and society there - especially in Syria and Lebanon. It is no coincidence that Azzam Faha declared that the number of Eretz Yisrael refugees in foreign countries is up to 250,000 (the number may be a slight exaggeration, but it is close to reality). In addition, it is no coincidence that the Transjordan radio - Radio Jerusalem - began broadcasting announcements, a series of "educational lectures" for the people of Eretz Yisrael urging them to return to their country and help "the war effort", providing "definitive proof" that those who returned were not risking their lives, especially considering the fact that "all over the world, only 10% fight and the rest serve in the rear", and especially "when the Arabs are on the brink of certain victory". The announcements made by King Abdullah regarding the refugees etc., are also characteristic. These announcements and declarations simply prove that as early as in the first weeks following the peak in migration, late May and early June, the refugee problem in neighboring countries was beginning to be bothersome in different ways that we address below. The issue was especially irksome due to the particularly large number of people lacking means among the migrants.
One of the important questions related to the problem of Arab migration was whether the Arab migrant would become a fighter or not. The Arab fighter has not turned into a fighter. His sole focus now is collecting handout money. He has accepted the lowest standard of living, choosing it over joining the war. There are many factors at play here, but two are central: First, the assessment of Jewish strength and the crisis of confidence in Arab strength. Second, the war in Eretz Yisrael developed in such a way that there was no room for "volunteers" to fight, not to mention that the main volunteer force, the "Liberation Army", fell apart at the time. The refugee problem troubling Arab countries has a significant impact on society and on the economy and brings with it problems which will grow worse, particularly given that no serious, comprehensive and organized measures are taken by Arab countries to resolve the issue.
---------
Annex No. 1
Evacuated Arab Villages by District:
a. Tel-Hai district
Total residents 23,790
Migrated 20,620
Remained 3,170
|
Village populations during normal times |
|||||
|
Madahil |
) |
|
Kirad al-Ghanname |
|
350 |
|
Arab al-'Azaziyat |
) |
410 |
Kirad al-Baqqara |
|
360 |
|
Khisas |
|
530 |
Deishum |
|
590 |
|
Zuq a-Tahtani |
) |
|
Malikiyya |
|
360 |
|
Zuq al-Fawqani |
) |
1050 |
Nabi Yusha' |
|
70 |
|
Shawka |
|
200 |
Qadas |
|
320 |
|
Abil al-Qamh |
|
330 |
'Alma |
|
950 |
|
Hunin |
|
1620 |
Saliha |
|
1130 |
|
Khalisa |
|
1840 |
Rihaniyya |
|
290 |
|
Na'ima |
|
1310 |
Ras al-Ahmar |
|
660 |
|
Lazzaza |
|
230 |
Dallata |
|
360 |
|
Qaitiyya |
|
940 |
Qaddita |
|
240 |
|
Manshiyya (included with Zuq a-Tahtani) |
Ammuqa a-Tahta | ) | |||
|
Mansura |
|
360 |
Ammuqa a-Fuqa |
) |
140 |
|
'Abisiyya |
|
830 |
Ein Zaitun |
|
620 |
|
Dawwara |
|
700 |
Biriyya |
|
240 |
|
Hamra |
|
|
Mirun |
|
290 |
|
Muftakhira |
|
350 |
Mughr al-Kheit |
|
490 |
|
Salihiyya |
|
1520 |
Mansurat al-Kheit |
|
900 |
|
Zawiya |
|
760 |
Arab al-Heib |
|
|
|
Jahula |
|
420 |
Ja'una |
|
1150 |
|
Buwaiziyya |
|
510 |
Zhahiriyya |
|
350 |
|
Khiyam al-Walid |
|
210 |
Akbara |
|
410 |
|
Dirbashiyya |
|
310 |
Safed |
|
5770 |
|
Ghuraba |
|
220 |
Sammu'i |
|
310 |
|
Arab a-Zubeid |
) |
|
Fir'im |
|
740 |
|
Mallaha |
) |
890 |
Qabba'a |
|
460 |
|
Baisamun |
|
20 |
Marus |
|
80 |
|
'Ulmaniyya |
|
260 |
Arab al-Zanghariyya |
|
840 |
Degree of Evacuation
|
Date |
Village |
Full/Partial |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory, comments |
|||||||||||||||||
|
18.1 |
Mughr al-Kheit |
F |
Our reprisal |
To Syria, after stealing our sheep herd |
|||||||||||||||||
|
“ |
Mansurat al-Kheit |
“ |
“ “ |
To Syria |
|||||||||||||||||
|
12.2 |
Shawka |
“ |
“ “ |
To Shawka Fuqa, returned shortly after. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
26.3 |
Khisas |
P |
|
|
|||||||||||||||||
|
29.3 |
Khiyam al-Walid |
F |
Participated in attack on Lehavot |
To Syria. Some returned later. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
7.4 |
Madahil |
|
|
To the Golan |
|||||||||||||||||
|
20.4 |
Arab a-Zubeid |
F |
General departure of Mughrabis |
To Lebanon |
|||||||||||||||||
|
20.4 |
'Ulmaniya |
F |
Our action |
Many killed |
|||||||||||||||||
|
21.4 |
Huseiniyya |
F |
Effect of our action in ‘Ulmaniya |
|
|||||||||||||||||
|
22.4 |
Kirad al-Baqqara |
F |
Effect of our action “ and fear of invasion. |
To Syria. Some joined the Syrian army |
|||||||||||||||||
|
22.4 |
Kirad al-Ghanname |
F |
Effect of action and fear of invasion |
To Syria. Some joined the Syrian army |
|||||||||||||||||
|
30.4 |
Madahil |
F |
Prior to attack on Kfar Szold |
To the Golan. Knew about the attack and fled beforehand. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
1.5 |
Arab al-'Azaziyat |
F |
Attack on Kfar Szold |
To Banyas. Joined gangs. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
1.5 |
Khiyam al-Walid |
F |
“ “ |
To Seida-Syria. Fled completely after returning earlier. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
1.5 |
Hamra |
F |
Attack on Lehavot, our harassment |
To Syria and Dirbashiyya. Participated in attack on Lehavot. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
1.5 |
Ghuraba |
P |
Attack on Lehavot, our harassment |
To Syria and Dirbashiyya. Participated in attack on Lehavot. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
1.5 |
Muftakhira |
P |
Attack on Lehavot |
In Dirbashiyya. Returend later. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
2.5 |
Ein Zaitun |
F |
Destruction of village by us |
Many killed |
|||||||||||||||||
|
2.5 |
Biriyya |
F |
“ “ |
“ “ |
|||||||||||||||||
|
2.5 |
Qaitiyya |
P |
Harassment, threat of attack and convoy passage |
Returned later |
|||||||||||||||||
|
3.5 |
Hunin |
F |
Fear of our attacks |
In Lebanon |
|||||||||||||||||
|
4.5 |
Arab a-Zanghariyya |
F |
Searches by us |
Syria (?) |
|||||||||||||||||
|
4.5 |
Arab al-Qudeiriyya |
F |
“ “ |
“ |
|||||||||||||||||
|
4.5 |
Arab as-Samakiya |
F |
“ “ |
“ |
|||||||||||||||||
|
9.5 |
Ja'una |
F |
As Safed faltered |
Ras al-Ahmar. Our actions in Safed had an effect. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
9.5 |
Deishum |
F |
Concentration of gangs our them and our actions |
To Lebanon |
|||||||||||||||||
|
10.5 |
Safed |
F |
Occupied |
Beirut, Damascus, Huran. Critical impact on the vicinity. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
10.5 |
Akbara |
F |
Many killed |
|
|||||||||||||||||
|
10.5 |
Zhahiriyya |
F |
Safed impact (?) |
|
|||||||||||||||||
|
10.5 |
Abil al-Qamh |
F |
Fear of invasion, fall of Safed. |
To Lebanon. Some fled in the beginning of the incidents. |
|||||||||||||||||
|
11.5 |
Qaddita |
F |
Fall of Safed impact |
Sa’sa’ – outside borders of State of Israel. |
|||||||||||||||||
| 11.5 | Zuq a-Tahtani | F | " " " " | To Lebanon | |||||||||||||||||
| 11.5 | Khalisa | F | Asked for agreement with fall of Safed. Refused. Fled. |
To ‘Udaysa, Lebanon. There had been an agreement with them previously. Kept well. |
|||||||||||||||||
| 11.5 | Buwaiziyya | F |
Fled with the evacuation of Khalisa |
To Lebanon. Afraid because they were on our traffic line. |
|||||||||||||||||
| 12.5 | Sammu'i | F | Fall of Safad | ||||||||||||||||||
| 14.5 | Na'ima | F | " " |
To Syria. Entered negotiations beforehand, but fall of Safed determined. |
|||||||||||||||||
| 14.5 | Shawka | F |
" " fear of invasion |
To Syria | |||||||||||||||||
| 16.5 | Muftakhira | F |
The Sheikh was afraid and left with everyone |
This is the final flight, after they returned once. |
|||||||||||||||||
| 16.5 | Nabi Yusha' | F |
Our attack on Police station |
||||||||||||||||||
| 19.5 | Qaitiyya | F |
Threats and our whispering operations by us |
Final exit, since some returned. | |||||||||||||||||
| 21.5 | Zuq al-Fawqani | F |
Our Whispering operation and mortars |
Effect of mortars strong. | |||||||||||||||||
| 21.5 | Lazzaza | F |
Our Whispering operation |
To Syria | |||||||||||||||||
| 24.5 | Manshiyya | F |
Our Whispering operation |
To Lebanon. | |||||||||||||||||
| 24.5 | Zawiya | F | Our attack |
Some to Hula marshes, some to Syria. |
|||||||||||||||||
| 24.5 | Ammuqa a-Tahta | F | Our action | To Lebanon. | |||||||||||||||||
| 24.5 | Ammuqa a-Fuqa | F | " " | " " | |||||||||||||||||
| 25.5 | Khisas | F |
Whispering operation and Safed effect |
To Syria | |||||||||||||||||
| 25.5 | Saliha | F |
Our warnings and Whispering operation |
Some to the marshes and some to Syria |
|||||||||||||||||
| 25.5 | Mansura | F |
Our Whispering operation |
To Syria | |||||||||||||||||
| 25.5 | Baisamun | F | " " | " | |||||||||||||||||
| 25.5 | 'Abbasiyya | F | Flight from Mansura impacted | To Syria | |||||||||||||||||
| 25.5 | Dawwara | F | Whispering operation | To Dirbashiyya | |||||||||||||||||
| 25.5 | Salihiyya | F | Wanted to negotiate. We did not turn up. Afraid |
Friendly village, fear because we did not turn up to negotiate. |
|||||||||||||||||
| 26.5 | Fir'im | F | Our attack on them | To Lebanon | |||||||||||||||||
| 26.5 | Qabba'a | F | Our attack on them | " | |||||||||||||||||
| 26.5 | Marus | F | Our attack on them and in the area | " (?) | |||||||||||||||||
| 28.5 | Malikiyya | F | Our occupation | To Lebanon. Wanted to return and tried to negotiate | |||||||||||||||||
| 28.5 | Qadas | F | Effect of occupation of Malikiyya | To Lebanon | |||||||||||||||||
| 28.5 | Ghuraba | F | Final evacuation | ||||||||||||||||||
b. Sea of Galilee District
|
Village populations during normal times |
|||
|
Maghar |
2,140 |
Kafr Sabt |
480 |
|
Yaquq |
210 |
Samra & Nuqeib |
290 |
|
as-Samakiya |
380 |
Kafr Kama |
660 |
|
a-Tabigha |
330 |
'Ubeidiyya |
920 |
|
Ghuweir Abu Shusha |
1,240 |
'Ulam |
720 |
|
Eilabun |
550 |
al-Hamah |
290 |
|
Majdal |
240 |
Hadatha |
550 |
|
Arab al-Mawasi |
1,870 |
Tiberias |
5,770 |
|
Bu’eineh |
540 |
Adasiyya |
|
|
Nimrin |
320 |
Sirin |
|
|
Hittin |
1,190 |
Ma'dhar |
510 |
|
Lubya |
2,350 |
Samakh |
3,660 |
|
Shajara |
770 |
Arab a-Zubayd |
|
|
al-Manara |
490 |
Khirbat al-Qadish |
410 |
|
Arab Nasir a-Din |
90 |
|
|
Degree of Evacuation
|
Date |
Village |
Full/Partial |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory, comments |
||||||
|
22.12 |
Tiberias |
- |
Fear |
From outlining area into central areas |
||||||
|
1.2.48 |
Samakh |
P |
Tension, as located on crossroads |
Mostly the wealthy, women and children are evacuated. 50% had left before the complete evacuation. |
||||||
|
5.3 |
'Ubeidiyya |
F |
Fear as a result of being surrounded by Jews |
To the area of Nazareth |
||||||
|
15.3 |
Adamiyya |
F |
Transjordan government orders |
Since they are Persian, many to Persia and the rest to Transjordan |
||||||
|
6.4 |
Sirin |
F |
Transjordan government orders |
Area of Nazareth and Transjordan |
||||||
| 6.4 | ‘Ulam | F | “ “ | " " " | ||||||
| 6.4 | Hadatha | F | “ “ | " " " | ||||||
| 6.4 | Ma'dhar | F | “ “ | " " " | ||||||
|
15.4 |
Samakh |
F |
Fear when they heard about the action in Tiberias |
To border villages in Transjordan. Bedouins. |
||||||
|
18.4 |
Tiberias |
F |
Our action. Lack of local leaders. The wealthy fled earlier |
Nazareth, Lubya, Hammah – Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon |
||||||
| 19.4 | Arab al-Zubayd | F | Tiberias effect. |
To Ein Mahil. Sometimes come down to work fields |
||||||
| 21.4 | Samra & Nuqeib | F | Tiberias effect |
To Syrian mountains. The village are tenant farmers. Syrian origin |
||||||
| 21.4 | Khirbat al-Qadish | “ “ | To Lubya and Samakh | |||||||
| 21.4 |
Ghuweir Abu Shusha |
P | “ “ | |||||||
| 21.4 | Arab Shajara | P | “ “ | Nazareth | ||||||
| 21.4 | Samakh | P |
Our attack on Samakh |
To Transjordan. The foreigners did not let everyone leave. |
||||||
| 22.4 | Majdal | F |
Our attack. Tiberias and Samakh effect |
To Transjordan. Transported in buses. |
||||||
| 22.4 | Kafr Sabt | F |
Tiberias and Samakh effect |
|||||||
| 23.4 | Nasir a-Din | F |
Appearance of gang |
Lubya and vicinity | ||||||
| 28.4 | Samakh | F |
Occupation of police |
To Hamah Transjordan | ||||||
| " | Ghuwier | F |
Fall of Tiberias had very strong impact |
|||||||
| 28.4 | Abu Shusha | F | Fall of Samakh | To the mountains in the area | ||||||
| 1.5 | a-Tabigha | F | Samakh effect | To Syria and Safed | ||||||
| 6.5 | Arab Shajara | F | Our attack | To the Nazareth area. | ||||||
c. Gilboa District
|
Village populations during normal times
|
|||||
|
Qumya |
450 |
Arab al-Bawati |
) |
|
|
|
Sulam |
500 |
Kafr Bawati |
) |
700 |
|
|
Dahi |
120 |
Hamidiyya |
|
300 |
|
|
Nein |
200 |
Beit Shean |
|
5000 |
|
|
Indur |
600 |
Arab az-Zinati |
|
500 |
|
|
Tamra |
70 |
Arab ‘Arida |
) |
|
|
|
Kafr Misr |
400 |
Arab Safa |
) |
600 |
|
|
Tira Harb |
200 |
Arab al-Khuneizir |
|
400 |
|
|
Taiyiba |
450 |
Farwana |
|
350 |
|
|
Na’ura |
250 |
Samiriyya |
|
500 |
|
|
Kafra |
700 |
Jabbul |
|
250 |
|
|
Yubla |
150 |
Zir’in |
|
1300 (out of the country) |
|
|
Murassas |
600 |
Nuris |
|
700 |
|
|
Danna |
400 |
Mazar |
|
350 |
|
|
Bira |
500 |
Sandala |
|
350 |
|
|
Kawkab al-Hawa |
600 |
Tall a-Shawk |
|
120 |
|
|
Arab al-Bashatiwa |
1,000 |
Arab a-Sakhina |
|
200 |
|
Degree of evacuation
|
Date |
Village |
|
Full/ Partial |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory, comments |
||
|
30.3 |
Qumya |
|
F |
Isolation among Jews, lack of transportation and work |
To Beit Shean, Nazareth and Transjordan |
||
|
30.3 |
Bawati |
|
F |
Light reprisal action |
To Transjordan. Bedouin |
||
|
15.4 |
Tira |
|
F |
Friendly Jewish advice |
|
||
|
1.5 |
Beit Shean |
|
P |
Fear and Haifa effect |
To the Triangle and Transjordan |
||
|
1.5 |
Jabbul |
|
P |
Fear |
|
||
|
1.5 |
Hamidiyya |
|
P |
Fear, proximity to Jews |
|
||
|
1.5 |
Zir’in |
|
P |
Our attacks are a factor |
|
||
|
11.5 |
Farwana |
|
F |
Our action |
To the Triangle |
||
|
12.5 |
Beit Shean |
|
F |
Occupation. Fear.Haifa effect |
Evacuation lasted until 22.5 |
||
|
12.5 |
Hamidiyya |
|
F |
Fall of Beit Shean |
To Transjordan, to the Triangle (Arraba) |
||
|
12.5 |
Samiriyya |
|
P |
Farwana impact |
To the Triangle |
||
|
16.5 |
Kawkab al-Hawa |
|
F |
Occupation of the village by us |
To Transjordan |
||
|
16.5 |
Kafra |
|
F |
Occupation of Kawkab effect |
To Transjordan and the Triangle |
||
|
16.5 |
Yubla |
|
F |
Kawkab action effect |
To Transjordan |
||
| 16.5 | Murassas | F | “ “ “ | “ | |||
| 16.5 | Danna | F | “ “ “ | “ | |||
| 16.5 | Bira | F | “ “ “ | “ | |||
| 16.5 | Arab al-Bashatiwa | F | “ “ “ | “ | |||
|
16.5 |
Arab a-Sakhina |
|
F |
Because of attack on Tira Zvi. Afraid to remain in proximity to Jews. Harassment action – catalyst. |
Went up the Gilboa. |
||
|
18.5 |
Jabbul |
|
F |
Effect of our action in Kawkab |
To Transjordan? |
||
|
20.5 |
Sulam |
|
F |
Members of the Zu’biya. protégé Arabs. |
To Nazareth. |
||
|
20.5 |
Dahi |
|
F |
|
To Nazareth. |
||
|
20.5 |
Nein |
) |
F |
Evacuated upon receiving |
“ |
||
|
20.5 |
Tamra |
) |
F |
threatening letters from the |
“ |
||
|
20.5 |
Kafr Misr |
) |
F |
gangs, and with the arrival of |
“ |
||
|
20.5 |
Tira Harb |
) |
F |
foreigners to the area – feared |
“ |
||
|
20.5 |
Taiyiba |
) |
F |
their villages would be seized |
“ |
||
|
20.5 |
Na’ura |
) |
F |
by foreigners |
|
||
|
20.5 |
Khuneizir |
F |
|
Beit Shean and Gesher front |
To the Gilboa |
||
|
20.5 |
Arab Safa |
F |
|
“ “ |
To Transjordan (originally from Transjordan |
||
|
20.5 |
Arab ‘Arida |
F |
|
“ “ |
“ “ |
||
|
20.5 |
Arab az-Zinati |
F |
|
“ “ |
“ “ |
||
|
24.5 |
Indur |
F |
|
“ “ |
To the Nazareth area |
||
|
27.5 |
Samiriyya |
F |
|
Our action in the village |
To the Triangle |
||
|
28.5 |
Danna |
F |
|
Our notice to clear out |
|
||
|
28.5 |
Zir’in |
F |
|
Occupation |
|
||
|
30.5 |
Mazar |
F |
|
|
|
||
|
31.5 |
Sandala |
F |
|
Occupation of Mazar influenced |
|
||
d. Yizreel District
|
Population during normal times |
||||
|
Nazareth |
14,200 |
Ghubayya Fawqa |
) |
|
|
Zippori |
4,330 |
Ghubayya Tahta |
) |
|
|
Kafr Manda |
1,260 |
Naghnaghiyya |
) |
1,260 |
|
Rummanah |
880 |
Abu Shusha |
|
720 |
|
Kafr Kanna |
1,960 |
Qira |
|
140 |
|
Reina |
1,200 |
Umm a-Zinat |
|
1,450 |
|
Mashhad |
660 |
a-Rihaniyya |
|
340 |
|
‘Illut |
1,310 |
Daliyat a-Rawha |
|
310 |
|
Ma'lul |
690 |
Buteimat |
|
110 |
|
Yafia |
1,400 |
Khubbeiza |
|
290 |
|
Iksal |
1,000 |
Umm al-Shawf |
|
530 |
|
Dabburiya |
1,290 |
Umm al-Fahm |
|
4,000 |
|
Ein Mahil |
1,040 |
Arab a-Zubeidat |
|
|
|
Sejera (Sea of Galilee district) |
|
Arab al-Khalf |
|
|
|
Lid al-'Awadin |
710 |
Arab a-Sa’ida |
|
|
|
Ein al-Mansi |
100 |
Arab al-Qa’biya |
|
|
|
Lajjun |
600 |
Arab al-Hujayrat |
|
200 |
|
Jenin |
3850 |
Arab al-Jawamys |
|
150 |
|
Zabuba |
560 |
Arab al-Mazarib |
|
100 |
|
Arab Susafi |
150 |
Arab al-Ghazalin |
|
|
|
Arab Hudeidin |
|
Arab Zbeih |
|
1,500 |
|
Kufrein |
920 |
Arab Sa’yda |
|
|
|
Waldheim |
260 |
Beit Lahem |
|
8,800 |
|
Mujaidal |
1,600 |
|
|
|
Degree of evacuation
|
Date |
Village |
c |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory, comments |
||||||||
|
|
Shajara |
F |
Our attack |
Nazareth, Tur’an, Ein Mahil |
||||||||
|
|
Lid al-'Awadin |
F |
Mishmar HaEmek effect |
To the Triangle. Tried to return and expelled. |
||||||||
|
|
Ein al-Mansi |
F |
Our attack |
To the Triangle |
||||||||
|
|
Lajjun |
F |
“ “ |
“ |
||||||||
|
|
Jenin |
F |
“ “ |
“. Serious focus of invasion |
||||||||
|
|
Rummanah |
F |
Fear of attack |
To the Triangle |
||||||||
|
|
Zabuba |
F |
“ “ |
“ |
||||||||
|
|
Ghubayya Fawqa |
F |
Our attack |
“ |
||||||||
|
|
Ghubayya Tahta |
F |
“ “ |
“ |
||||||||
|
|
Abu Shusha |
F |
“ “ |
“ |
||||||||
|
|
Qira |
F |
Fear, and effect of attacks in the area. |
To Transjordan |
||||||||
|
|
Umm a-Zinat |
F |
Our attack |
To the Karmel and Umm al-Fahm |
||||||||
| Rihaniyya | F | Fear | “ “ “ | |||||||||
|
|
Daliyat a-Rawha |
F |
Fear |
To the Triangle |
||||||||
|
|
Buteimat |
F |
“ |
To Umm al-Fahm |
||||||||
|
|
Khubbeiza |
F |
“ |
“ |
||||||||
|
16.4 |
Arab a-Zubeidat |
F |
Ramat Yohanan incidents |
Tzipori lands |
||||||||
| Arab al-Khalf | F | “ | “ “ | |||||||||
| Arab Sa’yda | F | “ “ | “ “ | |||||||||
|
|
Arab al-Mazarib |
P |
Concerns |
|
||||||||
|
|
Arab Zbeih |
P |
Our attack |
Tur’an, Nazareth, Karmel |
||||||||
|
|
Arab a-Sa’ida |
F |
Mishmar HaEmek incidents |
To the Karmel |
||||||||
|
|
Arab al-Hujayrat |
F |
Mishmar HaEemek, Ramat Yohanan incidents |
To Tzipori |
||||||||
|
|
Arab Susafi |
F |
|
To Abu Shusha and Mansi |
||||||||
| 9.2 | Arab Hudeidin | F | “ “ “ | |||||||||
|
|
Naghnaghiyya |
F |
|
|
||||||||
|
|
Kufrein |
F |
|
|
||||||||
e. Haifa and Western Galilee District
|
District population during normal times |
|||
|
Shfaram |
3950 |
Manshiyya |
1140 |
|
Balad a-Sheikh |
4500 |
Sumeiriyya |
820 |
|
Haifa |
71200 |
A-Zib |
2050 |
|
Al-Mazra’a |
460 |
al-Bassa |
3140 |
|
Ard al-Saris |
|
Umm al-Faraj |
860 |
|
Yajur |
610 |
Nahr |
3070 |
|
Ghabisiyya |
740 |
Amqa |
1930 |
|
Fureidis |
870 |
Kuweikat |
1130 |
|
Acre |
15000 |
Damun |
340 |
|
Ein Ghazal |
2410 |
Sheikh Daud |
590 |
|
Ijzim |
2970 |
Kafr Lam |
380 |
|
Iqrit |
520 |
Ein Hawd |
380 |
|
Quseir |
320 |
Jaba’ |
1270 |
|
I'billin |
1800 |
|
|
|
Kabri |
1640 |
|
|
|
Umm a-Zinat |
1470 |
|
|
Degree of evacuation
|
Date |
Village |
Full/ Partial |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory, comments |
|||||||
|
7.1 |
Balad a-Sheikh |
P |
Refinery incident |
To the Triangle and Acre |
|||||||
|
7.1 |
Hawasa |
P |
“ “ |
“ “ |
|||||||
|
3.2 |
Haifa |
P |
Fear of what is to Come |
Syria and Lebanon, mostly the wealthy evacuated |
|||||||
|
6.2 |
Mazra’a |
F |
Surrounded by Jews |
A few stayed under protection of General McMillan |
|||||||
|
12.2 |
Ard al-Saris |
F |
Appearance of foreign force |
To Shfaram |
|||||||
|
18.2 |
Yajur |
P |
|
|
|||||||
|
18.2. |
Haifa |
P |
Fear for the Children |
To Lebanon. [Archbishop George] Hakim’s operation |
|||||||
|
15.3 |
Arab al-Ghuneima |
P |
Haifa effect |
To Damun and vicinity |
|||||||
|
4.4 |
Hawasa |
Many |
|
|
|||||||
|
4.4 |
Ghabisiyya |
P |
|
|
|||||||
|
18.4 |
Yagur |
Many |
Appearance of Muhammad Mahmoud |
To the Triangle, Kabri and Acre. |
|||||||
|
20.4 |
Shfaram |
P |
Druz defeat in Ramat Yohanan |
To Nazareth |
|||||||
|
22.4 |
Tira |
P |
Appearance of Foreigners |
|
|||||||
|
22.4 |
Haifa |
Most |
Haifa occupation Operation |
To Lebanon, Syria, Acre, Triangle and Tantura |
|||||||
|
24.4 |
Reidis [Fureidis?] |
Many |
Order from Arab Army to evacuate women and children |
|
|||||||
|
25.4 |
Acre |
The wealthy |
Haifa action effect |
To the border villages, Lebanon |
|||||||
| 25.4 | A-Sheikh | Everyone | “ “ “ | “ “ “ | |||||||
| 25.4 | Hawasa | F | “ “ “ | “ “ “ | |||||||
| 25.4 | Yajur | F | “ “ “ | “ “ “ | |||||||
| 25.4 | Ein Ghazal | P | “ “ “ | To the Triangle | |||||||
| 25.4 | Ijzim | P | “ “ “ | “ | |||||||
| 26.4 | Iqrit | P | Rumor about convoy to Yehiam | Northwards to the border | |||||||
| 27.4 | Quseir | P | Haifa effect | Northwards | |||||||
| 1.5 | Acre | Many | “ “ | ||||||||
| 2.5 | I'billin | All | To Sa’sa’ and Sha’ab | ||||||||
| 3.5 | Tira | Many | Appearance of foreigners. | Center of foreigners | |||||||
| 5.5 | Kabri | All | Fear of reprisals after the attack on Ehud | [illegible], Lebanon, north | |||||||
| 6.5 | Acre | Many | Harassment, Typhus plague | To Haifa, Transjordan, Syria | |||||||
f. Central Region and Jaffa District
|
District population during normal times |
|||
|
Tantura |
1650 |
Fardisya |
20 |
|
Fureidis |
870 |
Arab an-Nuseirat |
|
|
Sabbarin |
1880 |
Tira |
3440 |
|
Sindiyana |
1390 |
Qalansuwa |
1660 |
|
Umm a-Shawf |
480 |
Arab al-Rumeilat |
|
|
Bureika |
320 |
(near HaMaapil) |
|
|
Arab al-Ghawarina |
690 |
Sayyidna 'Ali |
|
|
Qannir |
750 |
Jlil |
1020 |
|
Kafr Qara |
1510 |
Kafr Saba |
1370 |
|
Arab Turqman |
|
Biyar 'Adas |
300 |
|
Arab al-Bara |
|
Sheikh Muwannis |
2000 |
|
Qisarya |
1240 |
|
|
|
Wadi ‘Ara |
260 |
Arab Abu Kishk |
1900 |
|
Sarkas |
|
Arab Salama |
800 |
|
Dumeira |
620 |
Miska |
650 |
|
Arab al-Fuqara |
340 |
Khirbat 'Azzun |
994 |
|
Arab a-Nufei'at |
910 |
Mirr |
190 |
|
‘Ara |
890 |
Fajja |
1360 |
|
Kh. Zalafa |
370 |
Arab al-Jarmala |
|
|
Khirbat Manshiya |
280 |
Yahudiyya |
6560 |
|
Arab Hawarith |
1440 |
Kafr 'Ana |
2000 |
|
Umm Khalid |
1050 |
Saqiya |
1240 |
|
Khirbat Beit Lid |
500 |
Khairiyya |
1600 |
|
Salama |
7610 |
Jammasin |
2050 |
Degree of evacuation
| Date |
Village |
Full/Partial |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory, comments |
|||
| 21.2 |
Khirbat 'Azzun |
P |
|
To the village of ‘Azzun, Sheikh Muwannis, first village evacuated in this area. |
|||
| 25.12 |
Summeil |
Everyone |
|
Jammasin |
|||
| 31.12 |
Arab al-Balawina |
Everyone |
Fear |
|
|||
| 7.1 |
Jammasin |
Many |
|
|
|||
| 12.1 |
Qisarya |
Beginning |
|
|
|||
| 31.1 |
Arab Abu Rizik |
Everyone |
|
|
|||
| 3.2 |
Arab an-Nuseirat |
Everyone |
Our actions |
To Taybeh, Qalansuwa. The village is empty |
|||
| 3.2 |
Sayyidna 'Ali |
Everyone |
Fear of hostile action. Surrounded |
Qalqiliyah and vicinity. Village occupied by our forces. |
|||
| 3.2 |
Kafr Mirr |
Everyone |
General fear |
To Kafr Qasem and the mountains. Village is empty. |
|||
| 8.2 |
Jarmala |
P |
Gang orders |
To Kafr Qasem |
|||
| 9.2 |
Qisarya |
P |
Rate of evacuation [greatly increased] |
|
|||
| 11.2 |
Arab a-Shubak |
Everyone |
Reprisal by Dissidents |
To Arab Abu [kishk] |
|||
| 11.2 |
Khirbat 'Azzun |
Everyone |
Fear and actions |
To village of ‘Azzun |
|||
| 15.2 |
Arab Turqman |
Everyone |
Fear of hostile action by us |
Mansi Wad, Almuha |
|||
| 15.2 |
Qisarya |
Everyone |
Occupied by our forces |
Tantura, Haifa Village is empty |
|||
| 15.2 |
Kafr Mirr |
- |
Some returned |
|
|||
| 15.2 |
Arab al-Rumeilat (near HaMaapil) |
F |
General fear and Whispering operation by us |
To the mountain and to Bureij |
|||
| 15.2 |
Arab al-Rumeilat (near Netanya) |
P |
General fear and Whispering operation by us |
To the mountain and to Bureij. 150 on May 4. |
|||
| 15.2 |
Arab al-Rumeilat (near Kadima) |
F |
General fear and Whispering operation by us |
To the mountain and to Bureij |
|||
| 15.2 |
Arab Haweitat |
F |
General fear |
To the mountains between Taybeh and Irtah. |
|||
| 17.2 |
Dhaqaba |
Everyone |
Appearance of foreigners at the locale. |
|
|||
| 17.2 |
Fajja |
P |
After the Irgun action. |
|
|||
| 25.2 |
Arab Hijazi |
Everyone |
|
|
|||
| 27.2 |
Wadi ‘Ara |
Everyone |
After the attack on Ma’anit |
‘Ar’ara, Ya’bed. Occupied by our forces |
|||
| 6.3 |
Bureika |
Everyone |
|
|
|||
| 15.3 |
Arab Mahadw |
Everyone |
Fear of reprisal after Arab mine was laid in vicinity |
To Tulkarm. Village is empty. |
|||
| 15.3 |
Arab Hawarith |
Everyone |
After we sabotaged Arab transportation near the village |
Qaqun, Baqa al-Gharbiyye. The village is empty. |
|||
| 17.3 |
Jammasin |
Most |
General fear |
To Ghasam |
|||
| 20.3 |
Umm Khalid |
Everyone |
Located inside Jewish community. Afraid of it and of hostile actions |
Tulkarm. Occupied by our forces. |
|||
| 20.3 |
Khirbat Beit Lid |
Beginning |
After we sabotaged Arab transportation |
To Beit Lid. Village is empty |
|||
| 23.3 |
Arab al-Koz |
Everyone |
|
To Lod |
|||
| 30.3 |
Arab Abu Kishk |
Everyone |
After splitter’s action in Sheikh Muwannis |
Kharish |
|||
| 30.3 |
Sheikh Muwannis |
Everyone |
After the abduction by the Dissidents |
Qalqiliyah, abroad. Fled with Arab Abu Kishk. |
|||
| 30.3 |
Arab Salama |
Everyone |
Effect of Dissidents in Sheikh Muwannis |
Kharish |
|||
| 30.3 |
Arab a-Nufei'at |
Everyone |
|
To Sarkas |
|||
| 1.4 |
Jaramalla |
Everyone |
General fear |
Majdal Kafr Qasem. Some come and work during the day. |
|||
| 3.4 |
Arab Imrir |
Everyone |
After robbery and murder committed by Dissidents |
To the area of Qalqiliyah and Jaljulia. The place is empty. |
|||
| 3.4 |
Arab al-Hawk |
Everyone |
After robbery and murder committed by Dissidents |
Taybeh, Tira. Some returned to their tribe in Negev. |
|||
| 3.4 |
Arab al-Fallaq |
Everyone |
Cattle robbery by Irgun, and transportation problems |
Tira and Triangle. The village is empty. |
|||
| 3.4 |
Jlil |
Everyone |
Effect of Dissidents and their action in Sheikh Muwannis |
Qalqiliyah and Tira. Occupied by our forces. |
|||
| 3.4 | Khirbat 'Azzun | End | End of evacuation at the demand of the Haganah | To the village of ‘Azzun. Occupied by our forces. | |||
| 5.4 | Qannir | P | Beginning of evacuation. Fear of our actions | Jenin area. | |||
| 5.4 | Khirbat Beit Lid | Everyone | Fear. Transportation | To Beit Lid | |||
| 10.4 | Arab al-Fuqara | Everyone | Received order to evacuate from Haganah | Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty. | |||
| 10.4 | Arab a-Nufei'at | Everyone | Received order to evacuate from Haganah | Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty. | |||
| 10.4 | Bamariya | Everyone | Received order to evacuate from Haganah | Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty. | |||
| 12.4 | Biyar 'Adas | Everyone | Our actions in the area | Jaljuliya and vicinity. Occupied by our forces | |||
| 15.4 | Sarkas | Everyone | Received order to leave from Haganah | Wadi al-Moya, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Jit. Village is empty. | |||
| 15.4 | Khirbat Zalafa | Everyone | Effect of vicinity | ‘Atil, Zeita. According to advance agreement between us and them. | |||
| 15.4 | Khirbat Manshiya | Everyone | Effect of vicinity | According to advance agreement between us and them. | |||
| 15.4 | Miska | Everyone | On orders of the Haganah | Tira, Qalqiliyah. Occupied by our forces. | |||
| 15.4 | Abu Zureiq | Everyone | |||||
| 17.4 | Arab al-Bara | Everyone | Fear of hostile actions by us | To Sarkas, Tantura. Ein Ghoz, Ijzim. The village is empty. | |||
| 17.4 | Kafr 'Ana | P | Ramla, Lod. | ||||
| 20.4 | Sawalima | Everyone | Occupied by our forces | Ramla, Lod and the vicinity. | |||
| 25.4 | Saqiya | Everyone | Occupied by our forces | Ramla, Lod and the vicinity. | |||
| 25.4 | Khairiyya | Everyone | |||||
| 25.4 | Salama | Everyone | Occupied by our forces | Ramla, Lod and the vicinity. | |||
| 25.4 | Kafr 'Ana | Everyone | Occupied by our forces | Ramla, Lod and the vicinity. | |||
| 25.4 | Qannir | End | Effect of the area –stoked fear | Jenin area. The village is destroyed | |||
| 25.4 | Beit Dajan | Everyone | After occupation of Khairiyya | Harassment by Jews. Yahudiyya. Lod, Ramla | |||
| 26.4 | Bureika | Everyone | Fear | To Sindiyana | |||
| 26.4 | Sarkas | Everyone | Fear of actions | To Lod | |||
| 28.4 | Rantiya | Everyone | After our attack | Laban, Shuqba, al-Manar, Yahudiyya, | |||
| 1.5 | Yazur | Everyone |
Harassment by Jews Jaffa effect |
Lod, Jammasin and Sheikh Muwannis | |||
| 2.5 | Sindiyana | P. | Fear of Arab revenge as they lent to Jews | ||||
| 4.5 | Yahudiyya | Everyone | Occupied by the Irgun | Ramla, Lod and vicinity. Occupied by Irgun | |||
| 4.5 | Tira (Qaqun) | P. | Effect of attack on Qannir | Men still there. | |||
| 5.5 | Bureika | Everyone | ‘Inin, Rummanah. Some present –surrendered. | ||||
| 6.5 | Tantura | P. | Evacuation of women and children | ||||
| 8.5 | Kafr Qara | Everyone | Our attack on them. | ‘Ar’arah, Barta'ah, Ya'bad. The village is empty. | |||
| 8.5 | ‘Ana | Everyone | Effect of our attack on Kafr Qara | ‘Ar’arah, Ein Salha. The village is empty. | |||
| 10.5 | Arab al-Jarmala | End | General fear. | Majdal, Kafr Qasem, come to work during the day. | |||
| 14.5 | Sabbarin | Everyone | Occupied by the Irgun | ‘Ar’ara, Ya’bed. Occupied by the Irgun. | |||
| 14.5 | Sindiyana | Everyone | Occupied by the Irgun | ‘Ar’ara, Ya’bed. Occupied by the Irgun. | |||
| 14.5 | Umm a-Shawf | Everyone | Occupied by the Irgun | Rummanah, Umm al-Fahm. Occupied by the Irgun. | |||
| 14.5 | Qalqiliyah | P. | Women and children. | Was receiving point, turned into flight point | |||
| 15.5 | Arab Jalad | Everyone | Effect of [declaration] of Jewish state | Tulkarm, Danaba. The village is empty. | |||
| 15.5 | Kafr Saba | Everyone | Occupied by our forces | Qalqiliyah area. Occupied by our forces. | |||
| 15.5 | Fajja |
Everyone (end) |
Our pressure – Whispering operation | To the mountains – the remaining few left. | |||
| 19.5 | Qalqiliyah | Everyone | After harassment actions by us. | ||||
| 20.5 | Hablah | Everyone | Harassment actions by us. | ||||
| 21.5 | Tantura | Everyone | Occupied by our forces. | Everyone held captive in their locale. Our forces are in the village. | |||
g. The south and the Negev
|
Population during normal times |
||||
|
Bureir[*] |
|
4000 |
al-Mansura |
100 |
|
Huleiqat |
) |
1500 |
'Arab Suqreir |
430 |
|
Kawkaba |
) |
Yasur |
1070 |
|
|
Najd |
|
600 |
Sawafir Gharbiyya |
1030 |
|
Sumsum |
|
1200 |
Sawafir Shamaliyya |
680 |
|
Jammama |
|
150 |
Julis |
1130 |
|
Muharraqa |
) |
1100 |
Batani a-Sharqi |
710 |
|
Kawfakha |
) |
Barqa |
980 |
|
|
Huj |
|
800 |
Beit Daras |
3010 |
|
Beit Tima |
|
1060 |
Arab as-Satariyya (Abu Khatab) |
|
|
Sarafand al-Kharab |
|
1130 |
Na'ani |
2270 |
|
Wadi Hunein |
|
1770 |
Abu Shusha |
950 |
|
Shafun |
|
|
Saidun |
230 |
|
Arab Satariyya (Abu Suweira) |
|
|
Khulda |
300 |
| Arab Rubin | 1550 | Dayr Muheisin | 360 | |
|
Qubeiba |
|
1870 |
Beit Jiz |
600 |
|
Zarnuga |
|
2600 |
al-Qabab |
2160 |
|
Yibna |
|
5920 |
Shahma |
310 |
| Bir Salim | 950 | Bureir[*] | 4000 | |
| 'Aqir | 2710 | |||
| Mughar | 1900 | |||
| Bashshit | 1770 | |||
| Qatra | 1320 | |||
[*name of locality repeated in original Hebrew]
Degree of evacuation
|
Date |
Village |
Full/ Partial |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory |
Comments |
|
12.5 |
Bureir |
F. |
Our actions |
Mostly to Majdal and others: Beit Lahiya, Nazla Hirbiya |
|
|
12.5 |
Huleiqat |
F. |
Bureir evacuation effect |
Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. |
|
|
12.5 |
Kawkaba |
F. |
Bureir evacuation effect |
Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. |
|
|
12.5 |
Najd |
F. |
Our ultimatum |
Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. |
Over time, some returned. |
|
12.5 |
Sumsum |
F. |
Our ultimatum |
Nazla Hirbiya, Beit Lahiya, Majdal. |
Over time, some returned. |
|
22.5 |
Jammama |
F. |
Our action. |
|
Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin |
|
25.2 |
Muharraqa |
F. |
Our action. |
|
Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin |
|
25.5 |
Kawfakha |
F. |
Our action. |
|
Remained in their area, being semi Bedouin |
|
28.5 |
Huj |
F. |
Ultimatum |
To Dimra |
|
|
29.5 |
Beit Tima |
F. |
Our action. |
|
|
|
20.4.48 |
Sarafand al- Kharab |
F. |
Fear. Surrounded. |
Ramla, Lod |
Handover of Rishon LeTzion police to us. |
|
17.4.48 |
Wadi Hunein |
“ |
Bombing of Hassan Salameh headquarters. |
“ “ |
|
|
9.5.48 |
Shafun |
“ |
Occupation of Beer Yaakov camp |
“ “ |
|
|
9.5.48 |
Arab Abu al-Fadl |
“ |
“ “ |
Qubeiba, Yibna |
|
|
9.5.48 |
Arab Satariyya (Humeida) |
“ |
|
Beersheba |
|
|
1.6.58 [sic] |
Arab Rubin |
“ |
Expelled as a result of our action |
Coastline sands, south of Yibna |
|
|
27.5.48 |
Qubeiba |
“ |
Our action, expulsion |
Yibna sands, Ashdod |
|
|
27.5.48 |
Zarnuga |
“ |
Occupation and expulsion |
Yibna and Ashdod |
|
|
4.6.48 |
Yibna |
“ |
“ “ |
To southern communities, al l the way to Gaza |
All residents of Yibna, Zarnuga, Qub. Went south all the way to Gaza when these locales were occupied |
|
9.5.48 |
Bir Salim |
“ |
Attack on orphanage |
Ramla – Lod |
|
|
6.5.48 |
'Aqir |
F. |
Our action, occupied |
Mughar, Bashshit, Yibna, Ramla |
Some remained in the village (women, elderly and children) |
|
18.5.48 |
Mughar |
F. |
Occupation. |
Yibna, Ashdod, Gaza, Khan Yunis |
|
|
13.5.48 |
Bashshit |
“ |
“ |
Mughar, Yibna, Gaza and vicinity |
|
|
17.5.48 |
Qatra |
“ |
“ |
Masmiyya |
Was protégé village until Egyptians arrived near Ashdod. |
|
20.4.48 |
al-Mansura |
“ |
“ |
Village completely destroyed |
|
|
25.1.48 |
'Arab Suqreir (Abu Suweira) |
“ |
“ |
South to the sands and to Gaza |
|
|
11.6.48 |
Yasur |
|
“ |
|
|
|
18.5.48 |
Sawafir Gharbiyya |
“ |
Fled as the front approached Hamama |
|
|
|
18.5.48 |
Sawafir Shamaliyya |
“ |
“ “ |
|
|
|
11.6.48 |
Julis |
“ |
Occupation |
|
|
|
13.5.48 |
Batani a-Sharqi |
F |
Occupation |
Ashdod, Hamama |
|
|
13.5.48 |
Barqa |
“ |
“ |
Hamama, Ashdod |
|
|
11.5.48 |
Beit Daras |
“ |
“ |
“ |
|
|
9.5.48 |
Arab Satariyya Abu Khatab |
“ |
Fled because of military actions nearby |
Yibna Sands |
|
|
14.5.48 |
Na'ani |
“ |
|
Some to Ramla, some to Qazaza. Was protégé village after it surrendered. Abandoned on 10.6 |
|
|
20.5.48 |
Abu Shusha |
“ |
Occupation |
|
|
|
20.1.48 |
Saidun |
“ |
Village abandoned |
|
|
|
20.4.48 |
Khulda |
“ |
Occupation |
|
|
|
20.4.48 |
Dayr Muheisin |
“ |
“ |
|
|
|
20.4.48 |
Beit Jiz |
“ |
“ |
|
|
|
|
Beit Susin |
“ |
“ |
|
|
|
|
al-Qabab |
“ |
“ |
|
|
|
14.5.48 |
Shahma |
“ |
Actions in the area |
|
Village abandoned |
h. Jerusalem area
|
Population during normal times |
|||
|
Lifta |
2730 |
Qastal |
100 |
|
Qalandia |
200 |
Saris |
600 |
|
Beit Safafa |
1510 |
Bidu |
560 |
|
al-'Eizariyah |
1130 |
Nabi Samwil |
210 |
|
Abu Dis |
2070 |
a-Tur |
2960 |
|
Beit Sahur |
2590 |
Beit Hanina |
1700 |
|
Bethlehem |
9140 |
Judayra |
200 |
|
Beit Jala |
3740 |
Bayt Nabala |
630 |
|
Jericho |
3210 |
al-Jib |
890 |
|
'Esawiyah |
780 |
Rafat |
300 |
|
Dayr Yasin |
650 |
Shu'fat |
810 |
|
'Ein Karim |
3390 |
Dayr Muheisin |
500 |
|
Qalunya |
970 |
Beit Jiz |
600 |
|
Beit Iksa |
880 |
Beit Surik |
510 |
|
Malliha |
2070 |
Dayr Ayyub |
350 |
|
Ramallah |
5180 |
|
|
Degree of evacuation
|
Date |
Village |
Full/ Partial |
Evacuation cause |
Evacuation trajectory, comments |
|
||||
|
31.12 |
Lifta |
P. |
|
To Malliha |
|
||||
|
1.1 |
Arab Romema |
Everyone |
|
|
|
||||
|
1.1 |
Upper Lifta |
Everyone |
|
To Malliha |
|
||||
|
2.1 |
Jerusalem - Katamon |
Many |
|
To Egypt, Lebanon |
|
||||
|
4.1 |
Qalandia |
Everyone |
|
|
|
||||
|
5.1 |
Jerusalem - Katamon |
Many |
|
To Egypt, Lebanon |
|
||||
|
8.1 |
Jerusalem – Sheikh Jarah |
Very many |
|
|
|
||||
|
9.1 |
Jerusalem - Schneller |
Everyone |
|
Beit Nabala, Ramallah |
|
||||
|
11.1 |
Jerusalem - Musrara |
Very many |
|
|
|
||||
|
18.1 |
Beit Safafa |
P. |
|
|
|
||||
|
18.1 |
Jerusalem – Sheikh Badr |
|
|
|
|
||||
|
27.1 |
'Eizariyah |
Many |
|
Mostly toward Hebron. |
|
||||
| 27.1 | Abu Dis | Many | “ | “ “ | |||||
| 27.1 | Beit Sahur | Many | “ | “ “ | |||||
| 27.1 | Beit Safafa | Many | “ | “ “ | |||||
|
1.2 |
Bethlehem |
Small part |
|
To Jericho and Transjordan |
|
||||
| 1.2 | Beit Jala | “ | “ | “ “ “ | |||||
|
4.2 |
Jerusalem – near Talpiyot |
Everyone |
|
|
|
||||
|
12.2 |
Jerusalem - Talbiye |
Everyone |
Our propaganda |
|
|
||||
|
16.2 |
Beit Safafa |
Everyone |
|
Foreigners on site |
|
||||
|
16.2 |
Jericho |
A few |
|
To Transjordan |
|
||||
|
27.2 |
'Esawiyah |
Everyone |
Close to Jews |
To immediate vicinity |
|
||||
|
8.3 |
Jerusalem |
The wealthy, women, children |
|
Mostly to Lebanon |
|
||||
| 8.3 | Qalandia | Everyone | |||||||
| 22.3 | 'Esawiyah | Returned | after running to the near vicinity | ||||||
| 30.3 | 'Esawiyah | Everyone | Received order to evacuate from Arab Higher Committee | ||||||
| 1.4 | Jerusalem - Musrara | Everyone | |||||||
|
9.4 |
Dayr Yasin |
Everyone |
Dissidents’ action |
Most were killed |
|
||||
|
10.4 |
'Ein Karim |
Everyone |
|
Malliha, Beit Jala, Ramallah |
|
||||
|
10.4 |
Qalunya |
Women and children |
|
|
|
||||
|
15.4 |
Beit Iksa |
Everyone |
|
|
|
||||
|
18.4 |
Dayr Abu Tor |
Everyone |
Dayr Yasin effect |
|
|
||||
|
21.4 |
Malliha |
p. |
“ “ and appearance of foreigners |
|
|
||||
|
21.4 |
‘Ein Karim |
P. |
Women and children, and appearance of foreigners. |
|
|
||||
|
28.4 |
Ramallah |
Small part |
To Bethlehem |
|
|
||||
|
28.4 |
Jerusalem |
Small part |
To Bethlehem |
|
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Qastal |
Everyone |
Our occupation, the opening of the road |
|
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Qalunya |
Everyone |
“ “ |
|
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Saris |
Everyone |
“ “ |
|
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Bidu |
Everyone |
“ “ |
|
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Beit Iksa |
Everyone |
“ “ |
|
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Nabi Samwil |
Everyone |
“ “ |
|
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Abu Dis |
P. |
|
Only women and children |
|
||||
|
3.5 |
Abu Tor |
P. |
|
“ “ “ “ |
|
||||
|
3.5 |
'Eizariyah |
P. |
Appearance of many foreigners |
|
|
||||
|
6.5 |
Malliha |
P. |
|
To Bethlehem |
|
||||
|
6.5 |
Jerusalem – South |
Everyone |
|
To Christian institutions in the Old City and Bethlehem |
|
||||
|
9.5 |
Jerusalem – Old City |
Many |
|
Muslims go to the villages |
|
||||
|
11.5 |
Jerusalem – Old City |
Many |
|
Hebronites return to their city |
|
||||
|
11.5 |
Beit Iksa |
Everyone |
Our action |
|
|
||||
|
13.5 |
Judayra |
Everyone |
Orders from the legion to evacuate, needed as base |
|
|||||
|
13.5 |
Bayt Hanina |
Everyone |
“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ |
|
|||||
|
13.5 |
Bayt Nabala |
Everyone |
“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ |
|
|||||
|
13.5 |
al-Jib |
Everyone |
“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ |
|
|||||
|
13.5 |
Rafat |
Everyone |
“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ |
|
|||||
|
13.5 |
Shu'fat |
Everyone |
“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ |
|
|||||
| 15.5 | Jerusalem –Christians | To Bethlehem | |||||||
|
21.5 |
Jerusalem – Old City |
Many |
|
|
|||||
|
29.5 |
Dayr Muheisin |
Everyone |
Our action |
|
|||||
|
29.5 |
Beit Jiz |
Everyone |
“ “ |
|
|||||
|
? |
Beit Surik |
“ |
“ “ |
|
|||||
|
? ? |
Dayr Ayyub |
“ |
“ “ |
|
|||||
|
29.5 |
Jerusalem, outside the wall |
Everyone |
Occupied by us |
|
|||||
|
30.5 |
Jerusalem – Old City |
Many |
With the fierce battles |
|
|||||
Source: Akevot. “Intelligence brief from 1948 hidden for decades indicates Jewish fighters’ actions were the major cause of Arab displacement, not calls from Arab leadership.” Translation from Hebrew into English by Akevot from the original record's source: Hashomer Hatzair (Yad Yaari) Archive, file 95-35.27(3).
https://www.akevot.org.il/en/article/intelligence-brief-from-1948-hidden...