A Brief History of Israeli Military Ethics
The Israeli military (officially known as the Israel Defense Forces
, IDF) has often prided itself on adhering to the highest moral standards and is routinely described by Israeli political and military leaders alike as “the most moral army in the world.” This self-portrayal precedes the establishment of the Israeli armed forces, going back to the era of the paramilitary forces of the Zionist Yishuv
, primarily the
A written document spelling out an ethical code for the Israeli military appears to be of more recent vintage. An “ethical code” drafted by Israeli philosophy professor Asa Kasher was apparently in use by the Israeli military between 1996 and 2001, when it was replaced by a looser and less binding document. The latter document, translated into English as the “IDF Spirit ,” is described as the “ethical code of the IDF” on the official website of the Israeli military.* It contains a section titled “The Purity of Arms,” which states that soldiers will not use their weapons and force to harm human beings who are not combatants or are prisoners of war. The document also asserts the value of human life and affirms that human beings are of value regardless of origin, religion, nationality, gender, status, or position. But despite the emphasis that soldiers must do everything in their power to avoid harming noncombatants, the section of the code titled “Human Life” focuses on the lives of soldiers and their comrades and fails to mention the lives of noncombatants at all. It states that during combat, soldiers “will endanger themselves and their comrades only to the extent required to carry out their mission.”
The Revised “Ethical Code”
The “IDF Spirit” is not the only “ethical code” commissioned by the Israeli military. Another code, designed specifically to take into account the fight against “terrorism,” is detailed in two academic articles published in 2005 by Asa Kasher (the author of the first code) and Amos Yadlin , then commander of Israel’s College of National Defense (the institution that provides higher education for military commanders) and later head of Israeli military intelligence. Kasher and Yadlin’s two articles spell out the main principles of the revised “ethical code” and, more importantly, the arguments drawn from moral philosophy that support them.
The main innovation of the revised code concerns the “Principle of Distinction.” This principle governs the duties that the state has to different types of persons in the course of the fight against “terror.” Most significantly, the principles outlined by the code affirm that the state is morally required to attach greater importance to avoiding injury to the combatants of the state than to noncombatants who are not under the state’s effective control, even if they are not involved in “terror.” The authors state explicitly that avoidance of harm to citizen combatants should take priority over avoidance of harm to noncombatants. In this, they are breaking with centuries of theorizing about the rules of war, since the stance represented by the entire tradition of moral theory known as jus in bello (justice in war) draws a crucial distinction between combatants and noncombatants and prioritizes the duty to avoid harming noncombatants over the duty to avoid harming combatants.
In morality and in international law, the basis of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants rests on two grounds. First, combatants have intentionally embarked on acts of violence and are actively seeking to endanger others, thereby forfeiting their right to security and to be left in peace. Second, combatants are armed, prepared for combat, and capable of defending themselves. These distinctions place combatants in a different moral category than noncombatants according to prevailing conceptions of just war theory and international law. This moral principle is enshrined in international humanitarian law, which makes a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants without qualification, notably in the Fourth Geneva Convention . By prioritizing the lives of citizen combatants over those of noncombatants who are outside the control of the state, the authors of the code knowingly break with this moral and legal precedent. In other words, they repudiate the moral and legal principle that a state always has a greater duty to avoid harming noncombatants than combatants.
The main consideration put forward in the Israeli “ethical code” to justify prioritizing the lives of combatants over some noncombatants can be summarized as follows. In fighting “terrorism,” the state is engaged in military actions in areas outside its control. In those areas, there is a mix of combatants and noncombatants. This mix has not been created by the state that is carrying out military operations. Hence, the state should not be held responsible if, as a result of its military operations, it kills or injures the noncombatants found in that mixed vicinity. However, this attempt to justify the revisionist principle of distinction does not stand up to scrutiny because it is morally irrelevant. If one person attacks another or endangers the life of another in the course of pursuing a certain goal, the attacker’s responsibility or lack of responsibility for the location of his victim has no bearing on the morality of his action. Similarly, the fact that the state is not responsible for having placed noncombatants in an area outside of its control has no bearing on the moral responsibilities of the warring state toward noncombatants in that area.
There is a further problem with this attempt to justify the revised principle of distinction that applies to Israel in particular. It is patently false that the areas in which Israeli military and “counterterrorism” operations are conducted—predominantly the
Implications of the “Ethical Code”
It could be argued that armies always value the lives of their own soldiers over those of enemy civilians, and that the “ethical code” of the Israeli military is merely giving voice to a principle that is already implicitly, if not explicitly, embraced by every military institution. However, when an “ethical code” has been articulated for a state’s military that explicitly sanctions privileging the lives of that state’s combatants over noncombatants on the other side, and does so on supposedly moral grounds, the consequences of enacting that code can be expected to be quite far-reaching. If it is indeed the case that some military commanders are predisposed to give more weight to the lives of their fellow soldiers than to enemy civilians, providing them with the ethical cover to do so is likely to encourage them to err further in this direction. This can operate both at the level of military conduct on the ground as well as at the level of declarations made by military commanders or political leaders, as can be seen from some recent examples.
Israeli military conduct and the testimony of soldiers since the adoption of the code clearly demonstrate a disproportionate pattern of civilian casualties. In Operation Cast Lead
(OCL), a wide-scale ground, naval, and air offensive on the Gaza Strip waged by Israel between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, as many as 1,419 Palestinians were killed, including 1,167 noncombatants (82 percent of the total), according to the
Similar conclusions emerge from other Israeli military campaigns. On the Lebanese front, in the July-August conflict of 2006, some 1,200 Lebanese noncombatants and 49 Lebanese combatants were killed by the Israeli military, as opposed to 43 Israeli noncombatants and 119 Israeli combatants killed by
Conclusion
There is a longstanding tendency in Israeli public discourse to celebrate the morality of its military forces and to consider that the Israeli military is the “most moral” in the world. However, successive versions of the ethical codes of the Israeli military belie this emphasis on morality, even going so far as to endorse the violation of the principle of distinction in international law, which prioritizes the lives of noncombatants over those of combatants. Moreover, these violations of morality are located not just at the level of official doctrine; they are reflected in the conduct of the Israeli military and the pronouncements of senior political and military figures.
- *. The full text of the document was available on the official website of the Israeli military until 2014 but was subsequently only accessible on archived versions of the website.