On the occasion of his visit to
Sino–Palestinian relations have undergone various shifts since their establishment in the 1960s. Initially, China aligned itself closely with the Palestinian cause but distanced itself in the 1970s and then realigned itself in the 1980s and 1990s. However, that alignment has been largely rhetorical; China has provided little practical support for Palestinian objectives, for reasons that include China’s wider regional and global concerns, its growing ties with Israel, and the decline of the Oslo Process .
China’s Position during the Mandate and until the Establishment of the PLO
China's engagement with Palestine and the Palestinian issue began in the first half of the twentieth century with broad sympathy for the Zionist project. The Jewish community in China, although small, were enthusiastic Zionists and provided donations and investments to help construct a national home in Palestine. The Nationalist regime provided further backing, through diplomatic support for the Balfour Declaration . Underpinning this position were comparisons made by Chinese intellectuals between the persecution faced by Jews in Europe and persecution of the Chinese under Japanese rule. By contrast, Chinese knowledge about and response toward the wider issues at stake, including intercommunal rivalry and conflict in the 1920s and 1930s, was somewhat thinner and viewed largely through the lens of great power dynamics and its impact on British rule.
While the Nationalists abstained on the United Nations
votes that led to Israel’s creation, they did recognize Israel and authorized an Israeli consulate. After the communist victory in October 1949 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Israel’s attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing
were rebuffed. Beijing framed its approach toward the Arab–Israeli conflict through its wider engagement with the Arab world, most particularly with nationalist, “Arab socialist” regimes like the Baathists and in
China’s Limited Assistance to the PLO in the 1960s and early 1970s
The formation of the
The Arab-Israeli 1967 War had a significant impact on China's approach to the conflict and the Palestinians. Beijing was not a member of the United Nations at the time and it condemned Resolution 242 , which enshrined the principle of land for peace. For Beijing, the resolution did little more than establish a state of “no war, no peace” while benefiting only the superpowers.
Within the region, the 1967 War weakened Arab leaders like Nasser and increased the space for more autonomous Palestinian entities like
During this period, China’s principal contacts with the PLO was the Fatah leadership. This reflected both Fatah’s dominant position within the PLO, following its takeover of the organization in 1969, and China’s often-stated principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its partners. Consequently, Beijing gave minimal attention to other more Marxist-oriented Palestinian factions like the
China’s Shift to Diplomacy in the 1970s and 1980s
During the 1970s, China's support for the PLO declined. The Soviet Union
remained the principal communist power and therefore a greater priority for nationalist liberation movements like the PLO. Additionally, China's détente with the United States
(partly to marginalize the Soviet Union) and its membership in the United Nations and permanent seat on the UN Security Council
prompted a re-evaluation of priorities. China moved away from support for militant groups like the Eritrean Liberation Front
, the
China’s response to peace initiatives was mixed. It welcomed
In the 1980s, the PLO moved away from the armed struggle and toward a negotiated peace settlement, represented in its 1988
China’s Ties with Israel and Support for the Oslo Agreement
China began to develop ties with Israel in the 1980s. They were initially transactional and based on an arms trade in which Israel supplied China with Soviet-made military equipment it had acquired through its wars with Arab armies. Further contact followed, through the establishment of an Israeli consulate in Hong Kong in 1985 and meetings between the two countries’ leaders at the margins of the UN in 1987. In 1991 China abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86 which overturned Resolution 3379, enabling it to open full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. China was now able to participate in several multilateral working groups associated with the UN-sponsored peace process which followed the Madrid Conference in 1991.
China also reversed its position on Resolution 242 and its successor, Resolution 378. China’s acceptance of the two resolutions made it easier for Beijing to support the Oslo Agreement which was signed by Israel and the PLO in September 1993. Along with other states, Oslo became the international community’s point of reference for responding to and resolving the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. However, Oslo has effectively disconnected many states’ understanding and engagement with Israel and the Palestinians from the conflict. It has provided space for China to build bilateral political and economic relations with the two sides that are not bound by its position over the conflict. In practice, this has meant that China’s relations with Israel have flourished relative to Sino-Palestinian ties.
For Israel, economic exchange has surged with China since the 1990s. US concern at China’s rise and potential threat prompted it to dissuade Israel from arms sales to Beijing. While trade in arms had all but disappeared by the 2000s, American concerns persisted even as the nature of Sino–Israeli trade diversified into other sectors. This was largely due to growing Chinese interest and investment in Israel’s hi-tech sector, which can potentially be used for dual civilian and military use. So concerned was
Notwithstanding such complications within the Sino–Israeli relationship, the broadening and deepening of relations over the past two decades far surpassed China’s relations with the Palestinians. Economically, trade and investment are magnitudes of order smaller than that between China and Israel. Politically, China remains sympathetic to Palestinian interests but has done little to support them in practice. This was evident when the Oslo Process eventually collapsed and the
A Hesitant Foreign Policy in the Early 2000s
China’s hands-off approach was similarly apparent when the UN, US,
As in the earlier period, China’s relations with the Palestinians were largely dominated by its exchanges with the PLO/Fatah leadership and figures like Yasir Arafat and
China’s limited contact with other Palestinian groups has also been evident in its nonrecognition of the
Since the 2010s China has become a global power. Xi Jinping
became president in 2012 and had adopted a more robust foreign policy. For the Palestinians, that position has remained modest. China did vote with the majority of states at the UN and against Israel to grant Palestine non-member observer state status in 2012, and Xi proposed a
China’s limited approach has been similarly evident in multilateral forums like the BRICS . China and the other BRICS countries have regularly expressed their support for the two-state solution and criticized Israel for its occupation and settlement building on occupied territory in their annual summit declarations. However, they have not backed up those statements with any collective actions against Israel or in support of the Palestinians.
That reticence was on show during the 2014 war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Again, Beijing condemned Israeli violence but took no action to stop it. However, one notable event was China’s brief reopening of direct communication with Hamas. The special envoy, Wu Sike
, met party leader
In 2017 President Abbas visited Beijing. The Chinese leadership revised its Four Point Plan to incorporate reference to the Belt and Road Initiative , a vision to build connectivity across the Eurasian landmass and which had become a prominent feature of Chinese foreign policy. More substantively, Xi proposed to host a seminar to bring Israelis and Palestinians together to find a way forward in the peace process. The two-day “peace symposium” between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations took place in December. However, the Chinese were unable to get the two sides to commit to anything more than a nonbinding resolution which restated many of the principal features of the Oslo Process.
China’s Criticism of Trump Administration Initiatives
In 2019–20, the US
The Trump initiative was soon overshadowed by the Abraham Accords
, which were signed between Israel and the
A Hands Off Approach
The secondary consideration of Palestinian interests is also tangibly reflected in China’s piecemeal assistance. Between 2008 and 2022, for instance, China has only provided a modest amount of humanitarian assistance, totaling $11.28 million. Meanwhile China received substantial media attention for its position during the violence between Israel and Palestinians during May–June 2021. However, much of the explanation could be explained away as being mainly procedural, since China occupied the presidency of the UN Security Council at the time.
China’s offer to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians in April 2023 may also be seen as more rhetorical than practical. Foreign Minister Qin Gang
’s proposal followed China’s recent hosting of talks between Iran and
Overall, Sino–Palestinian relations have ebbed and flowed. They have been strongly influenced by Beijing’s shifting priorities and rivalries beyond the Palestinians and their conflict with Israel, to include other regional and global considerations, from the Soviet Union in the past to its relations with the United States, Israel, and
Because of this, the Palestinians do not occupy a central space in Beijing’s calculations in the region. Indeed, whereas Sino–Israeli ties have grown substantially since the 1980s, relations with the Palestinians have remained more partial and secondary. Certainly, the Chinese leadership has long been sympathetic to Palestinian interests over the years and expresses that position regularly, through including support for the two-state solution and calls for an end to Israeli settlement construction, but it has made little effort to back those words up with action. Chinese support for the Palestinians is largely superficial and limited, and this does not seem likely to change in the near future.