Mexico and the Palestine Question

Equidistance… in Israel’s Favor

Beginning in the 1940s, Mexico ’s stance on the Palestine question was one of neutrality. Mexico’s relative position in the international system explains this long-term trend. Beginning in the 1980s, however, Mexico’s Palestine policy has been influenced by domestic considerations and its strong dependence on the United States

Mexico’s Palestine Policy During the Authoritarian Era (1948–2000)

The ideas of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1923) oriented Mexico’s international relations until the 1980s. Under the presidency of Alvaro Obregón (1920–1924), state policies were guided by Mexican nationalism and the principles of nonintervention and self-determination of peoples. The Doctrina Estrada (1930), stipulates that Mexico does not publicly announce diplomatic recognition of other governments. (The Doctrina Estrada would later be invoked by Mexican administrations beginning in the 2000s for not recognizing Palestine as a state.)

Maintaining a Distance

In the interwar period up to 1945, Mexico stayed away from the brewing Palestinian question. At that time, in the context of serious tensions with Great Britain over oil, the Mexican Jewish community exerted pressure on the left-wing government led by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) to support the Zionist Movement at the League of Nations . Cárdenas, however, opted for not taking sides to preserve cordial relations with the Jewish and the Arab (“Syrian Lebanese”) communities and with Great Britain. It abstained in the vote on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 in 1947 that called for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state.

In 1949, Mexico voted in favor of Israel’s accession to the UN . It argued that Israel needed to be a member if it was expected to honor UN resolutions regarding the internationalization of Jerusalem , border delineation as indicated by the original resolution, and guarantees for the safety of Arab refugees, among other issues. Mexico maintained this position even though Israel often ignored UN resolutions. In 1952, it established official diplomatic relations with Israel and, in 1956, in the context of the Suez crisis , it appointed a diplomatic representative to Israel. During the 1967 War , Mexico called for peace but remained neutral in its official statements. During the October 1973 war , Mexico supplied oil to the countries affected by the Arab oil boycott, which eased its own national economic crisis.

Cautious Gestures toward the Palestine Liberation Organization

To boost the legitimacy of the political system, which had received a fatal blow after the 1968 massacre of students at Tlatelolco , the administration of President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–1976) forged closer relations with the Global South . In September 1975, the Foreign Ministry announced that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would establish an Information Office in Mexico, as part of a commitment made by then-President Echeverría to Yasir Arafat during an official visit to Egypt . Before opening the office, Mexico awaited the approval of several resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly, in October and November 1974, by which the PLO was recognized as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and was allowed to participate in sessions, conferences, and bodies of the United Nations. The Mexican government greatly restricted the structure, objectives, and status of this office, primarily as a result of pressure from the Jewish community in both the United States and Mexico, and did not give it formal diplomatic status; it also required an explicit commitment that the office would refrain from participating in “subversive activities.”

In November 1975, Mexico voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which described Zionism as a form of racism. In reaction, the Jewish community in Mexico incited a tourism boycott against the country, causing the resignation of Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa .

Since the mid-1980s, Mexico has returned to its previous official neutrality. The disastrous economic policy of President José López Portillo (1976- 1982) left the country plunged into the worst crisis in its postrevolutionary history, which ultimately led to the end of the oil “boom” and of revolutionary nationalism in foreign policy.

Neoliberalism and the US–Mexican Bilateral Agenda

During the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988), priorities changed in accordance with the neoliberal ideology gaining ground. With the signing of the Free Trade Agreement of 1991 , the United States became Mexico’s most important trade partner. After the signing of the Oslo Agreement between the PLO and Israel in 1993, the Mexican government unilaterally elevated the PLO’s office in Mexico to the rank of “Special Delegation of Palestine.” Throughout the 1990s, Mexico and Israel established closer ties in the political, cultural, and commercial fields. President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1994–2000) signed a free trade agreement with Israel in March 2000. The signature was preceded by the visit of Foreign Minister Rosario Green to Israel, Egypt, Jordan , and the autonomous Palestinian territories. (However, Green did not meet with Arafat.) At the same time, Mexico continued to officially regret the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as a “major obstacle to the peace process.”

Mexico’s Israel–Palestine Policy (2000–2019)

The victory of the right-wing Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in 2000 put an end to seventy-one years of the hegemonic party system under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Under the administration of Vicente Fox (2000–2006), a Mexican Representation Office to the Palestinian Authority was established in Ramallah in 2005.

With President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006–2012), Mexico was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the period 2009–2010. In that position the Mexican government denounced Israel’s disproportionate use of force against the Palestinian population during the 2008–2009 war in Gaza , while at the same time describing Israel’s actions as “reactions” and “replies” to the continued rocket fires from Gaza into Israeli territory; it never questioned the legality of a large-scale military operation by an occupier against an occupied territory.

Later, Mexico abstained from voting on the resolution that approved the findings of the Goldstone Report on Israel’s violations of international law, on the grounds that such a vote could limit follow-up to the report. In 2011, Mexico abstained from approving the entry of Palestine as a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and to the United Nations Human Rights Council on the grounds that such moves might limit the development of other conflict resolution initiatives, such as the negotiation talks by the Quartet (United Nations, United States, Russia , and the European Union ). Toward the end of Calderón's six-year term, Mexico finally recognized Palestine as a non-member observer state of the UN, but only after the UN General Assembly approved the 2012 resolution.

The PRI returned to power between 2013 and 2018, led by Enrique Peña Nieto , and during that period ties with Israel deepened and expanded. Several official visits took place: President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Mexico in the winter of 2013 and September 2017, respectively, and the Mexican president visited Israel in the fall of 2016. Mexico altered its positions on the Palestinian issue in favor of Israel, judging by the way in which Mexico dealt with two complicated episodes of the Palestinian–Israeli agenda starting in 2016. The first occurred in October 2016, when the Executive Council of the General Conference of the UNESCO approved a resolution to keep the Old City of Jerusalem and its walls in the list of world heritage in danger. Mexico voted in favor of the resolution, but later requested to change its vote to one of abstention. The second episode is related to the announcement by US President Donald Trump on 6 December 2017 that his country would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and would order the transfer of the embassy from Tel Aviv to that city. Days later, on 21 December, a majority of the UN General Assembly member states declared US unilateral recognition to be “null and void.” Mexico abstained and maintained its embassy in Tel Aviv. Strong lobbying of Zionist groups exerted a lot of pressure. But in November 2017, two months after Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Mexico, Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray (very close to Jared Kushner , Donald Trump’s son-in-law and advisor) announced that Mexico would “vote against UN resolutions that were contrary to Israel.”

Mexico’s Policy under a Leftist Government (2019–2024)

In January 2019, the Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA), a party which brings together many ideological voices from the Left, won the elections and its founder, Andrés Manuel López Obrador , became President. High-level political dialogue with Palestine increased significantly during his mandate (2019–2024). Mexico made additional contributions to UNRWA through the Agencia Mexicana para la Cooperación Internacional y el Desarrollo . One of the most significant events was the raising of the rank of the diplomatic mission of Palestine to “Embassy of the State of Palestine” in June 2023. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs labeled the move a “unilateral” decision. It is unclear whether Mexico’s position was prompted by lobbying or protests from the Jewish community in Mexico.

When Israel launched a genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023, the Mexican president called for the respect of international law. Over time, the severity of the Israeli offensive pushed Mexico, along with Chile , Colombia , Bolivia , and Brazil , to condemn Israel's devastating offensive. Mexico even joined Chile in January 2024 in referring the situation in the State of Palestine to the International Criminal Court for investigation into the probable commission of crimes within its jurisdiction. On 25 April, Mexico’s representative to the UN expressed support for Palestine becoming a full member of the UN.

The influence of a left-wing ideology as an explaining factor of these actions seems much less significant than contextual elements. In several Latin America countries, the reclassification of Palestinian offices occurred alongside two convergent processes: the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign and independent state and the updating of the diplomatic representation of these countries in Palestine at the embassy level under the principle of reciprocity. Relations with Israel were marked by some tensions during the López Obrador administration. One of the sources was the extradition demand by Mexico of Tomás Zerón , former director of the Criminal Investigation Agency of the Mexican Prosecutor's Office, who worked on the Ayotzinapa case (the torture and forced disappearance of the forty-three students on 26 September 2014 in the town of Iguala , in the state of Guerrero , Mexico) and then fled to Israel. The extradition request was denied on several occasions by the Israeli authorities; President López Obrador appealed to the Mexican Jewish community to exert pressure on Tel Aviv. It is plausible that Mexico’s endorsement of Palestine’s membership in the UN was related in part to the president’s frustration with Israel’s lack of cooperation.

Beyond those momentary tensions, the Mexico–Israel relationship was strong in different areas. Israel has made substantial investments in Mexico’s agrotechnology, pharmaceutical, renewable energies, and military and intelligence sectors. Its positions on Israel’s genocide in Gaza have been muted; in Mexico’s denunciation statements and communiqués it avoids reference to Israel, and it has not recalled its ambassador in Tel Aviv.

In summary, the principle of “equidistance” that had officially steered Mexico's positions regarding Palestine remained in force under the leftist MORENA government. The clinging to neutrality can be explained by the same structural factors that have affected previous governments: the relationship with the United States and the leverage from Mexican and American Jewish businessmen on Mexico’s policy on the Palestinian question. Such leverage is persistent and increases during crises or wars in which Israel is involved, as well as with severe tensions between Mexico and the United States as background.

Arab and Jewish Mexican Influence on Policy

Since the mid-1980s, two factors have reduced Mexico’s autonomy and inhibited strong and unequivocal stances in the Palestinian issue: economic dependence on the United States and the respective roles of the Arab and Jewish communities in Mexico.

Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians began immigrating to Mexico in the last decades of the nineteenth century. They worked in trade and related activities Whereas the Jewish migration was concentrated in Mexico City , the dispersion of Arab immigrants through different regions of the Mexican province reduced their potential. Before the mid-1980s, it was the Arab League that exerted pressure on the Mexican government through the Arab ambassadors to Mexico or their representatives to the United Nations. Arab immigrants were slow to organize themselves as a pressure group, and they did so in a decentralized manner, by region. Their ability to influence Mexico’s foreign policy decision-making in favor of Arab and Palestinian matters has remained minor. Whereas the Palestinian diaspora is estimated to be 13,000 persons, the much larger “Lebanese” diaspora in Mexico, about 500,000 strong, has shown little concern for Arab and Palestinian affairs..

The Jewish population of Mexico is about 65,000. Although they do not speak with one voice, those who are very vocal in favor of Israel are united by the Zionist ideology, and their transnational ties raise their chances of being effective. So, for example, a delegation of American Jewish Committee (AJC) leaders often meets with Mexican presidents, with the participation of representatives of the Mexican-American and Mexican Jewish communities. (The Central Committee of the Mexican Jewish Community has been an international partner of the AJC since 1999.) Mexico considers AJC to be an ally in negotiations with Washington on migration issues.

The Mexican Media and Civil Society

The absence of effective counterweights to presidentialism and the personalization of foreign policy means that the Mexican Congress generally follows the government’s lead. In addition, mobilization of public opinion on foreign policy issues is almost nonexistent. Mexican newspapers rely heavily on coverage by Western news agencies and major international media, which are biased toward Israel. The debate in Mexico is dominated by a few figures--opinion leaders, organic intellectuals who suddenly emerge as key analysts within an ethnoreligious group or a socioeconomic class. In most press outlets and TV news reports, Israel's actions are “responses” to Palestinian attacks; Israeli responsibility is discursively mitigated by pointing out the existence of “extremist minorities within both sides.” The press rely on factual simplifications or distortions: “bad decisions” of the Palestinians have led them to the path of uncertainty on which they now find themselves; the Israeli army is referred to as “Israeli defense forces”; Israel is presented as a plural, secular, and inclusive democratic state that legitimately protects itself from authoritarian state and non-state actors; the Palestinian group Hamas is blamed for global disorder, described simply as a terrorist group, and identified (together with Iran ) as sponsoring a culture of violence and hatred.

A nascent counterweight resides in civil society. In the context of the recent war and genocide, the Mexican academic community has expressed greater assertiveness than before. It has launched various initiatives in conjunction with academics from across Latin America, demanding an active academic boycott of Israeli universities. The organization Mexicanos Unidos requested the annulment of the free trade agreement with Israel and the cancellation of security and military cooperation agreements. The Comité de Solidaridad con Palestina and similar committees have led demonstrations in various cities. Likewise, civil society and the Boycott Divestment Sanctions movement have mobilized on the border with the United States against Israeli technology and have denounced the participation of Cementos Mexicanos in the construction of the wall in Gaza and the West Bank.

Conclusion

Mexico has routinely condemned Israel's violation of international law for seventy-five years. However, when making crucial decisions on the issue, it resorts to neutrality, considered by Mexican officials as part of what can be called “positive diplomacy.” This diplomatic tradition is linked to domestic concerns and Mexico’s interests and role, in which the United States is an unavoidable and crucial reference point. At the societal level, there is a greater and increasingly plural awareness, with the potential of being channeled in fruitful discussions between academics, professional networks, and civil society organizations.

Download